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I. PHANTOM REGULATION 
 
The Supreme Court fundamentally altered executive branch power 
and leverage to make law in America. In its 5-4 decision in Michigan v. 
Environmental Protection Agency,1 and for the first time, the Supreme Court 
mandated consideration of economic cost as the new fulcrum for exercise of 
executive branch law-making power.2 Amid daily palpable friction between 
the executive and legislative branches of government in the United States,3 
																																								 																				
1 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015).  
2 The federalist form of government, in which there is substantial separate power at the state or 
provincial levels in addition to at the federal level, include the United States (50 states, 2 
commonwealths, and 12 territories primarily in the Pacific Ocean), Canada (10 provinces and 2 
territories), Mexico (31 states), Brazil (26 states), Germany (16 states), Switzerland (26 cantons) 
Argentina (23 provinces), Australia (6 states and 2 territories), and India (29 states and 7 territor-
ies). This list includes the most significant and economically successful non-Communist countries 
on 5 continents, North America, Central America, South America, Europe, and Australia, as well 
as India in Asia. This form of government, while only shared in a small number of countries, has 
been employed in successful countries. See List of Countries By System of Government, http://cs.mc 
gill.ca/~rwest/wikispeedia/wpcd/wp/l/List_of_countries_by_system_of_government.htm (summ-
arizing countries that employ federalism as a form of government); see also Federalism, https://en 
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federalism (providing background on federalism as a system of government). 
3 Michele Richinick & Joy Y. Yang, Obama Sharply Crticizes Congress in White House Address, 
MSNBC (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obama-sharply-criticizes-congress-wh 
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previously untouchable conventional Chevron deference4 to executive branch 
power was altered. This article legally navigates through each aspect of this 
change: It analyzes current and future implications. of, and arising contro-
versies with, the new Supreme Court economic requirement on the exercise 
of executive power in American government. 
The Obama administration utilized executive branch action and 
regulations to create new law without needing to involve the legislature;5 the 
Trump administration is using unilateral executive orders, without involving 
the Congress, to attempt to dismember parts of the regulated state.6 This new 
Supreme Court decision changes legal requirements for executive actions 
applied in either direction. Friction between U.S. branches of government was 
a common denominator7 before the jobs of coal miners were a central topic in 
the most recent presidential election,8 with this administrative conflict already 
in motion in the courts.  
The Obama Administration Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
promulgated its Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (“MATS”) rule to reign in 
coal use and climate-changing emissions.9 The rule imposed approximately 
$9.6 billion in costs annually on the U.S. economy as the means to realize direct 
public hazardous pollutant benefits of $4 to 5 million annually.10 The costs of 
complying with this regulation were approximately 2,000 times greater than its 
estimated direct benefits of reducing hazardous coal-power plants’ air 
pollution, without adding indirect “co-benefits.”11  
																																								 																				
ite-house-address#52721 (providing instance of tension between government branches during 
Obama presidency); Robert Draper, Trump vs. Congress: Now What? N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, 
(Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/26/magazine/trump-vs-congress-now-what. 
html (providing instance of tension between government branches during Trump presidency). 
4 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
5 See Steven Ferrey, Presidential Executive Action: Unilaterally Changing the World’s 
Critical Technology and Infrastructure, 64 DRAKE L.R. 43 (2016) (Providing instance of 
executive branch creating law without legislature under Obama). 
6 Jacqueline Alemany, Trump Signs Executive Order Dismantling Obama Environmental 
Regulations, CBS NEWS (March 28, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-signs-exec 
utive-order-dismantling-obama-environmental-regulations/ (Providing instance of Trump Ad-
ministration using unilateral executive orders); Dan Boyce, Trump Targets EPA And Obama 
Climate Change Regulations, INSIDE ENERGY, http://insideenergy.org/2017/03/29/trump-targets-
epa-and-obama-climate-change-regulations/ (suspending the Clean Power Plan of the EPA). 
7 Alemany, supra note 6.  
8 Clifford Krauss & Michael Corkery, A Bleak Outlook for Trump’s Promises to Coal Miners, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 19), 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/business/energy-environ 
ment/a-bleak-outlook-for-trumps-promises-to-coal-miners.html. 
9 Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2705-06 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 9326). 
10 Id. 
11 The controversy concerning co-benefits is discussed in detail, infra., at Section V. 
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When states challenged when the executive agency initially failed to 
consider these costs which the regulation imposed on the U.S. economy, the 
Supreme Court ruled this unilateral executive action to be illegal.12 The Court 
created and imposed a new de novo “cost” consideration on the exercise of 
certain executive powers, even though the legislature did not expressly require 
any consideration of cost for this rule.13 Cost now exists as a phantom presence 
stalking future executive branch regulation, created sue sponte by the Court 
without statutory command. This Supreme Court decision in Michigan v. EPA 
shifts power between the Constitution’s Article I legislative branch and the 
Article II executive branch of American government. This article analyzes in 
detail the layers of legal complexities and examines still unresolved uncertain-
ties of this new rule of administrative and constitutional law.   
Section II examines sequentially all relevant executive orders on cost 
and economics issued as part of the prior five presidential administrations. 
Section II sets the legal stage, focusing particularly on cost consideration by 
the executive branch when promulgating environmental regulations and 
climate change rules. This flows into the key recent Supreme Court decision 
imposing a new legal requirement on Obama Administration executive branch 
regulation of carbon-emitting coal in the U.S. power sector.14  
When this rule was challenged in Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court, 
sue sponte, imposed a never-before-manifest cost restraint on the exercise of 
executive branch power.15 Section III analyzes this Supreme Court decision 
restraining executive power. Building the law on technology, Section III first 
examines the technology of coal in the U.S. economy. On this foundation, 
Section III goes on to analyze the Obama Administration MATS rule, parses 
the legal basis of the five-justice majority opinion, reflects critically on key 
elements of the four-justice dissent, and traces the original contours of the 
dissent by Judge Kavanaugh as well as the opinion of the majority of the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals that was reversed by the Court. 
Section IV examines every operand16 of this newly imposed cost 
algorithm for American law. In Michigan v. EPA,17 costs outweighed direct 
benefits by approximately 2000:1. Substituting the agency’s choice of operand 
																																								 																				
12 See Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2699 (confirming that unilateral executive action is illegal). 
13 See id. at 2711 (showing that the U.S. Supreme Court established a de novo cost consideration). 
14 See infra, Section II. 
15 See Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2699 (indicating that the Supreme Court imposed a cost 
restraint on executive branch power). 
16 Meriam-Webster defines an “operand” as “something (such as a quantity or data) that is oper-
ated on (as in a mathematical operation).” MERIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/operand (last visited Nov. 28, 2017).  
17 See Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2706 (providing instance when costs majorly outweighed benefits). 
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to add indirect co-benefits, reversed the regulatory economics to make indirect 
benefits exceed costs.18 Critics alleged that agencies will double-count so-called 
‘co-benefits’ to transform a directly not cost-beneficial executive regulation to 
be indirectly beneficial.19 Section IV dissects absolute costs, derivative costs, 
and disputed costs as elements of a cost analysis. Section IV takes the next step 
from the Michigan case of first impression, to examine whether executive 
branch agencies can employ their own algorithm on costs and benefits to steer 
the economic outcome of the newly required cost consideration.  
Section V exumes the “cost” phantom now lurking in administrative 
law. Section V examines the legal positions now asserted by the reversed fed-
eral agency, state Attorneys General, and private sector stakeholders on what 
is or is not an acceptable math algorithm regarding alleged ‘double-counting’ 
of co-benefits. The Michigan Supreme Court decision leaves the choice of the 
cost algorithm initially to the agency;20 once selected and applied, the algor-
ithm will be challenged whenever the imposed costs are billions of dollars 
annually, as they were in the Michigan case.21  
Section VI navigates thorugh the Administrative Procedure Act22 as 
interpreted by the Court, now reshaping conventional Chevron deference as the 
decision rule for the executive branch.23 Chevron is legally foundational: it is 
the most cited administrative law precedent by the Supreme Court year after 
year24 and one of the twenty most-cited Supreme Court cases in the history of 
the Court.25 The Michigan Court changed Chevron deference. As analyzed in 
the next sections, the legal contours and constraints of administrative law are 
altered and still evolving.   
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
18 See infra. Section IV. 
19 See infra. Section IV. 
20 Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2711. 
21 Id. at 2706. 
22 5 U.S.C. 551, et seq. 
23 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. 
24 Chris Walker, Most Cited Supreme Court Administrative Law Decisions, YALE J. ON REG.: 
NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 9, 2014).  
25 See Most-Cited U.S. Supreme Court Cases in Hein Online Part II, HEIN ONLINE BLOG, 
http://heinonline.blogspot.com/2009/01/most-cited-us-supreme-court-cases-in.html (supporting 
proposition that Chevron is frequently cited). 
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II. PRECIPITATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 
 
A. Constitutional Federalism Separating Branch I and Branch II 
 
 Federalism principles in the U.S. Constitution of checks and balances 
between executive and legislative branches separate the power of the branches 
of government. The U.S. Constitution Art. 1, § 8, gave Congress the power to 
make laws “necessary and proper” for carrying all other powers vested in 
Congress by the U.S. Constitution.26 “Necessary and proper” is a broad 
umbrella, which ultimately the Supreme Court must interpret.27 This works on 
two levels: (1) The federal government has authority to enact necessary and 
proper laws, and (2) once federal laws are enacted, administering federal agen-
cies must stay within their grants of authority under specific laws. In recent 
confrontations, there has been particular focus on regulatory authority under 
the 1970 Clean Air Act.28 
 And at this point in time, much of the focus is on climate change and 
global warming. Global energy-related emissions of carbon are expected to 
increase 57% from 2005 to 2030.29 At current rates of energy development 
worldwide, energy-related CO2 emissions in 2050 would be 150% of their 
current levels under business-as-usual development, primarily due to increased 
energy use.30 This Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) forecast is shown in Figure 1.31 The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) in 2014 concluded that in order to maintain world 
warming below 2° Celsius (C), there must be a 40-70% reduction of GHG 
emissions from 2010 levels by 2050.32 
																																								 																				
26 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
27 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall found 
that “necessary and proper” is broad enough to allow Congress to establish a bank to aid in 
carrying out the taxing and borrowing powers vested in the Congress under Article 1, § 8). 
28 See infra. Section III. 
29 U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-151, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
PROGRAMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (Nov. 2008), http://www. 
gao.gov/assets/290/283397.pdf 
30 Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. (OECD), Environmental Outlook to 2050: Key Findings 
on Climate Change, http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/Outlook%20to%202050_Climate%20Ch 
ange%20Chapter_HIGLIGHTS-FINA-8pager-UPDATED%20NOV2012.pdf. 
31 Id. 
32 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014 Synthesis 
Report Summary for Policymakers, https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5 
_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf. 
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Figure 133 
 
 
 
In 2013, without involving the Congress and using executive branch 
regulations, President Obama announced his “Climate Action Plan,” and direc-
ted EPA to work expeditiously to promulgate CO2 emission standards for fossil 
fuel-fired power plants.34 EPA estimated the benefits of its four Clean Air Act 
unilateral executive branch regulations would accrue a combined annual econ-
omic value of approximately $500 billion, and $2 trillion in 2020:35 
 
• The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, promulgated in July 2011, 
requires that 27 eastern states reduce the amount of emissions 
from cross-border power plants.36 EPA estimates that this rule 
accrues economic benefits of $120 t0 $280 billion annually.37  
																																								 																				
33 OECD, supra note 30 (“ROW” refers to “rest of the world”). 
34 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (June 2013), https:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf. 
35 Nicholas Z. Muller & Robert Mendelson, Efficient Pollution Regulations: Getting the 
Prices Right, 99 AM. ECONOMIC REV. 1714 (2009).  
36 See Overview of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2011). https:// 
www.epa.gov/csapr/overview-cross-state-air-pollution-rule-csapr (describing EPA rule on cross 
state air pollution). 
37 Cross State Air Pollution Rule: Reducing Air Pollution Protecting Public Health, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/csaprpresentation.pdf.  
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• The Mercury and Air Toxics (MATs) rule, promulgated in 
December 2011, regulates mercury and other hazardous air 
pollution emitted from both new and old power plants, to 
deliver between $37 and $90 billion of benefits annually.38   
 
• The Industrial Boiler Rule, promulgated in April 2012, lowers 
the amount of air pollution that is released from commercial, 
industrial and institutional boilers to generate between $27 and 
$67 billion annually in health benefits.39 
 
• The Cement Kiln Rule, promulgated in August 2010, reduces 
mercury and other air pollutants from cement plants across the 
country to generate an estimated $7-$19 billion annually in 
benefits.40 
 
EPA estimates the economic benefits of the four rules based in saved 
lives, averted emergency and hospital visits, prevented non-fatal heart attacks, 
and cost savings from missed work and school days.41 In essence, the reduct-
ions in chronic health conditions constitute the overwhelming share of the cost 
savings attributed to air pollution prevention, where health care accounts for a 
significant portion of all levels of governments’ budgets.42 EPA concluded that 
more than 160,000 lives were saved in 2010 because of the reductions in ozone 
and particulate matter following the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments which 
																																								 																				
38 Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/mats.  
39 Vol. 78, No. 21 FEDERAL REGISTER 7139 (Jan. 31, 2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pk 
g/FR-2013-01-31/pdf/2012-31646.pdf.  
40 Final Amendments to National Air Toxics Emission Standards and New Source Performance 
Standards for Portland Cement Manufacturing, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/2016-04/documents/080910_neshap_factsheet.pdf.  
41 James Bradbury, Bills That Would Limit the U.S. EPA's Clean Air Act Authorities, WORLD 
RES. INST. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.wri.org/stories/2011/04/bills-would-limit-us-epas-
clean-air-act-authorities; FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOW-
ING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 59-61 (2004).  
42 ELIZABETH MORSS & DAVID R. WOOLEY, THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 4 (26th ed. 
2016) (providing that this includes the Medicaid and Medicare programs, where Medicare 
incurs upwards of 45% of the medical bills of treating and managing air pollution induced 
diseases while Medicaid [split between federal and states government funds] covers over 
20% of these costs); see also Britt Groosman et al., The Ancillary Benefits from Climate 
Policy in the United States, 50 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 585 (providing that while some 
scholars argue that co-pollutant concerns should not inform climate policy, there is strong 
correlation between GHGs and traditionally regulated pollutants under the Clean Air Act).  
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were estimated to deliver economic benefits of approximately “$2 trillion in 
2020.”43 EPA conducted a Secondary Prospective Analysis in 2011 which 
showed an incremental increase in direct annual costs of air pollution control 
of approximately $70 per capita in 2000, $170 per capita in 2010, and $190 per 
capita in 2020.44 
“Benefits” associated with environmental rules represent quantified 
estimated health impacts. “In 2012, OMB reported estimated annual benefits 
from major federal regulations totaling $141 billion to $691 billion and 
estimated annual costs of $42.4 billion to $66.3 billion for fiscal years 2001 
through 2011, with EPA regulations accounting for 60 to 82 percent of the 
benefits and 43 to 53 percent of the costs.”45 All of these initiatives thrust the 
use of coal-fired power into the spotlight.  
Regarding regulation under the Clean Air Act, there is a specified 
division of state and federal authority where states have the “first-implementer 
role,”46 while EPA “is relegated . . . to a secondary role.”47 However, within this 
Clean Air Act envelope, there is no federal case law, nor any Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), Department of Energy (DOE), or Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) rules, which have, or can, resolve direct 
conflicts between counting environmental ‘benefits’ against the cost imposed on 
the operation of power generation units to reduce polluting operation.48   
																																								 																				
43 Teresa B. Clemmer, Staving off the Climate Crisis: The Sectoral Approach under the Clean 
Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1138 (2010). 
44 Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, Final Report – Rev. A 
at 3-7 (indicating that a large proportion of these costs are associated with direct capital 
investments in technology and other applications). 
45 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-14-519, EPA Should Improve Adherence to Guidance 
for Selected Elements of Regulatory Impact Analyses, Report to Congressional Requesters 
(July 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664872.pdf; see also Office of Management and 
Budget, Regulatory Analysis: Circular A–4 to the Heads of Executive Agencies and 
Establishments, 68 Fed. Reg. 58366 (2003), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/cir 
culars_a004_a-4/ (describing the benefit side of cost-benefit analyses); Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Executive Summary, Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
the Environment, at 19 (2006) (“Any project or policy that destroys or depreciates an 
environmental asset needs to include in its costs the [total economic value, or TEV] of the 
lost asset. Similarly, in any project or policy that enhances an environmental asset, the change 
in the TEV of the asset needs to be counted as a benefit. For instance, ecosystems produce 
many services and hence the TEV of any ecosystem tends to be equal to the discounted value 
of those services.”). 
46 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Train 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975)) (emphasis omitted). 
47 Train, 421 U.S. at 79. 
48 Steven Ferrey, “Broken at Both Ends the Need to Reconnect Energy and Environment,” 
65 SYRACUSE L.R. 1044, 97 (2015). 
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Efforts of the Obama administration to regulate the environment and 
climate focused on the power sector, with ‘cost’ emerging as a new legal factor 
in three key matters: 
 
• The attempt to restrict power plant hazardous mercury emis-
sions, which was overturned and remanded by the Supreme 
Court in Michigan v. EPA49 
 
• The attempt to regulate interstate migration of criteria air pollu-
tants, eventually upheld by the Supreme Court in EME Homer50 
 
• The attempt to restrict CO2 global warming emissions, focusing 
on coal-fired power plants, which was preliminarily enjoined 
indefinitely by the Supreme Court in West Virginia.51 
 
And ‘cost’ is the primary area where the Supreme Court has altered the 
separation of power and the line between executive and legislative branch 
discretion. Of note, Judge Kavanaugh, before he was nominated to be a mem-
ber of the Supreme Court, was a member of the D.C. Circuit panel which 
rendered the first two of these three opinions. The Supreme Court upheld his 
dissent in Michigan, and partially overturned the majority opinion he joined 
in EME Homer.52  
 
B. Cost-Benefit and EPA Regulation–the Context 
 
The Supreme Court discovery of costs, has some history. The U.S. 
Flood Control Act of 1936 mandated the evaluation of proposed projects to 
ascertain that the overall benefits outweigh the cost of the project.53 Since then, 
consideration of cost became part of the regulatory process, performing analy-
sis of cost and inflationary impacts during the terms of Presidents Nixon and 
Ford.54 The federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in its role 
																																								 																				
49 Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2711. 
50 EME Homer City Generation L.P., 696 F.3d at 31, rev’d. by E.P.A. v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 134 S.Ct. 1584 (2014). 
51 Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U.S. (February 9, 2016) (No. 157A773) 
(indefinite stay by Court). 
52 Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2711; EME Homer City Generation L.P., 696 F.3d at 32.  
53 EUSTON QUAH & RAYMOND TOH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CASES AND MATERIALS 6 
(2012). 
54 Carolene Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 22 
GEO. MASON. L. REV. 575, 580 (2015). 
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overseeing regulatory initiatives of all other government agencies, developed 
guidelines on researching regulatory options that produce maximized net 
benefits.55 OMB, following executive orders, has instructed agencies to conduct 
benefit-cost analysis to improve transparency in the regulatory process unless 
the same is prohibited by law, such as under the Clean Air Act National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) that implicity prohibits benefit-cost analysis.56  
During President Carter’s term, the agencies were required to perform 
cost-effectiveness studies, and during the term of President Reagan, cost-benefit 
analysis became a mandatory step in the regulatory process.57 President Reagan 
issued executive order 12291 requiring government agencies to perform 
Regulatory Impact Analysis (i.e. benefit-cost analysis) to reduce the burden of 
existing and future regulatory rules and require net benefits to the public.58 In 
practice, the EPA has performed a comparative pros-cons test of every ‘major 
rule’ (including almost all the NAAQS rules) since the Nixon Administration, 
which coincided with the most substantive Clean Air Act amendments.59  
Federal agencies, including the EPA, are required under Executive 
Order 12866, issued by President Clinton, to perform cost analysis when their 
actions are going to cause an economic impact on a scale of more than $100 
million per year, unless it is explicitly ordered otherwise by applicable stat-
utes.60 While determining what benefits are available, an agency is not 
restrained to consider only quantifiable benefits which can be measured in 
																																								 																				
55 U.S. OMB, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations under Executive Order 12866 
(Washington, D.C., January 1996). 
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1). 
57 Cecot, supra note 54, at 581.  
58 46 Fed. Reg 13193. 
59 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and 
the Value of Nothing 58 (2004) at 59-61 (Outlining “richer is safer” studies and other cost-benefit 
analyses); Matthew D. Adler & Erik A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. 
J. 165, 173-74 (1999) (highlighting cost-benefit analysis for agricultural pesticides).  
60 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Acts of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified 
at 2 U.S.C. § 32) (UMRA); Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (requiring agencies to 
perform cost study of rules impacting the economy. UMRA requires agencies to choose options 
which either reduces the cost due to the program or is the least burdensome to implement unless 
the agency can explain why the particular option should not be accepted; Executive Order 12866 
guides agencies that while promulgating regulations benefitting the public by improving public 
health or the environment from the failure of private sector’s initiatives on their own, agencies 
assess “all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives”; Also “Federal agencies should 
promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are 
made necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of private markets to protect 
or improve the health and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of the American 
people. In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of 
available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.”). 
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monetary units, but also allowed to consider qualitative benefits.61 While all 
the prior Executive Orders of prior Presidents remain in effect, President 
Obama issued Executive Order 13563 reaffirming that benefit-cost analysis is 
a mandatory part of the regulatory rulemaking process.62  
The era of modern environmental laws did not begin until 1970, with 
most federal environmental laws enacted between 1970 – 1980.63 See Table 1. 
 
 Table 1: Major U.S. Environmental Laws 
 
Name of Statute Known As Year Passed 
National Environmental Policy Act NEPA 1970 
Clean Air Act CAA 1970 
Clean Water Act CWR 1972 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act 
FIFRA 1972 
Ocean Dumping Act  1972 
Endangered Species Act ESA 1973 
Safe Drinking Water SDWR 1974 
Toxic Substances Control Act TSCA 1976 
Resources Conservation and 
Recovery Act 
RCRA 1976 
Comprehensive Environmental 
Response Compensation and 
Liability Act 
Superfund or 
CERCLA 
1980 
Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act 
EPCRA 1980 
 
Since the early days of Clean Air Act amendments in 1970, EPA has 
incorporated cost as a factor in its rulemaking process, either as a cost of the 
technology to achieve the standards, or as cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit 
analysis based on the above executive orders. There were at least seventy-four 
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) studies at EPA that factored cost either as part 
of a cost-effectiveness analysis or cost-benefit analysis to select between various 
options and technologies presented during the administrations of Presidents 
																																								 																				
61 Id. (“Costs and benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the 
fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and 
benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider.”). 
62 Cecot, supra note 54, at 582; 76 FR 3821.. 
63 STEVEN FERREY, Environmental Law: Examples & Explanations, 40 (7th ed. 2016). 
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Reagan, H.W. Bush, and Clinton.64 By contrast, in Michigan v. EPA, EPA 
claimed cost did not play any role during EPA’s MATS rulemaking, until the 
Supreme Court overruled the agency.65   
In addition to the generic executive orders that consider costs, some 
statutes mandate that EPA perform benefit-cost analysis as part of promul-gation 
of a regulation. And to the extent that the EPA follows or fails to follow this 
statutory mandate, courts are the arbiters. In Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckel-
shaus, EPA was challenged because EPA did not take economic cost into 
account while establishing standards of performance for Portland cement 
plants.66 The EPA was then regulating the cement plants under Clean Air Act 
section 111(b)(1)(A) after the cement plants were designated as the stationary 
source of pollution contributing to the “endangerment of public health and 
welfare or [safety].” 67 In the Clean Air Act section 111(a), “standards of perfor-
mance” are defined as a standard set by the administrator for the emission of an 
air pollutant given the best available technology and cost for attainment.68 The 
																																								 																				
64 Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-
Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 192, 192-211 (2007). 
65 See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791 (1998) (holding that EPA reasonably 
interpreted statute outlining various facets of nitrogen oxide emission limits); see also Arteva 
Specialties S.a.r.l. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088 (2003) (explaining EPA considered cost while 
performing cost-effectiveness analysis for NESHAPs under Clean Air Act section 
112(d)(2)); Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 
547 (2001) (providing that promulgating rules under Clean Air Act section 109, National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards, EPA is not required to consider cost-benefit analysis because 
unambiguous language of Act section 109 charges EPA to promulgate rule for public safety 
and does not required EPA to consider cost); American Lung Assn. v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 
(1998) (holding EPA did not adequately explain its conclusion that physical effects 
experienced by some asthmatics from exposure to short-term, high-level SO2 bursts did not 
amount to public health problem). 
66 Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 379 (1973).  
67 Id. at 378. 
68 42 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (“The term ‘standard of performance’ means a standard for 
emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable 
through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account 
the cost of achieving such reduction and any non-air quality health and environmental impact 
and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demon-
strated.”). The EPA Administrator in the Background Document required under NEPA, 
recorded the findings of total economic cost to the cement industry as a result of promul-
gation of rules regulating cement plants and relied on this findings during the rulemaking 
process. See Portland, 486 F.2d at 387 (citation omitted) (“The Administrator found in the 
Background Document that, for a new wet-process plant with a capacity of 2.5 million 
barrels per year, the total investment for all installed air pollution control equipment will 
represent approximately 12 percent of the investment for the total facility. He also found that 
‘[a]nnual operating costs for the control equipment will be approximately 7 percent of the 
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petitioners were not satisfied with the cost study done during the rulemaking 
process, and demanded a more quantified cost-benefit analysis. But, the court 
did not find the quantified benefit-cost analysis as a necessary requirement.69 
This resulting deference underwent a tectonic shift in the Supreme 
Court. 
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT SUA SPONTE INJECTS ECONOMICS IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: MICHIGAN V. EPA 
  
In Michigan v. EPA,70 the Supreme Court had to interpret what needed 
to be part of the unilateral administrative process when promulgating the scope 
of an “appropriate and necessary” standard for regulation of certain traditional 
steam-cycle power generators, Electric Utility Steam Generating Units (EGUs), 
delegated by the Congress to the Environmental Protection Agency under the 
Clean Air Act.71  
 
A. Coal, Mercury, Health 
 
The Congressional Research Service noted that “[c]oal is an inherently 
‘dirty’ fuel” that emits “sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), parti-
culates, mercury, acid gases, and other pollutants, in greater abundance than 
other fossil fuels.”72 When burned to produce electricity, coal is the most 
pollutant-emitting fossil fuel.73 Coal releases approximately 29% more carbon 
per unit of energy produced than does oil, and 80% more carbon per energy 
																																								 																				
total plant operating costs if a baghouse is used for the kiln, and 5 percent if an electrostatic 
precipitator is used.’”). 
69 Id. (“Such studies should be considered by the Administrator, if adduced in comments, but 
we do not inject them as a necessary condition of action.”); see also Essex Chemical Corp. 
v. Ruckelhaus, 486 F.2d 427, 437 (1973) (finding that EPA has considered cost while 
regulating Sulfur Dioxide pollution from Sulfuric Acid factories, even when EPA and the 
industry are differing in their opinion about the cost, EPA’s consideration of cost in 
rulemaking is enough and does not require cost/benefit analysis). 
70 Michigan, 135 S.Ct. 2699. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
72 JAMES E. MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EPA’S 
REGULATION OF COAL-FIRED POWER: IS A “TRAIN WRECK” COMING (2011), https://www. 
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41914.pdf.  
73 Id. The Congressional Research Service noted that “[c]oal is an inherently ‘dirty’ fuel. 
Burning it produces SO2, NOx, PM, mercury, acid gases, and other pollutants, in greater 
abundance than other fossil fuels.” JAMES MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, EPA’S REGU-
LATION OF COAL-FIRED POWER: IS A “TRAIN WRECK” COMING (2011), at 5, https://www. 
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41914.pdf.  
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unit than does natural gas.”74 Coal-fired power plants emit significantly more 
sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and particulate matter (PM), three 
of the six Clean Air Act regulated criteria pollutants, per megawatt hour (Mwh) 
of electric power generated compared to natural-gas and oil-fired plants.75  
Coal-fired power-generation units emit more hazardous air emissions, 
such as mercury, compared to other fossil-fuel power generation technologies.76 
Mercury (Hg) is a naturally occurring element,77 released to the environment 
in significant quantities through burning coal.78 Mercury is a pollutant which 
is regulated as a hazardous chemical by the Clean Air Act.79 A study conducted 
by EPA over more than twenty years concluded that the nation’s power plants 
using coal as their fuel are the largest source of non-natural mercury deposition 
into the environment.80 Mercury’s toxic effects on the human nervous system, 
digestive and immune systems, kidneys, lungs, skin, and eyes, lead to pre-
mature death of young children and people, and to adverse impact on the 
neurological development of the fetus.81   
There are 400 coal-powered plants82 which have traditionally supplied 
40 percent of U.S. electric power.83 In 19 U.S. states, coal is the dominant source 
																																								 																				
74 STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, Thomson Reuters, § 6:22 (46th ed., 201-87). 
75 Id. 
76 Environmental Protection Agency, Reducing Toxic Pollution from Power Plants: Epa’s 
Proposed Mercury Standards 2 (2011), http://Www3.Epa.Gov/Mats/Pdfs/Presentation.Pdf 
(providing hazards linked with coal generation units); JAMES MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA 
COPELAND, EPA’S REGULATION OF COAL-FIRED POWER: IS A “TRAIN WRECK” COMING 
(2011) at 5, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41914.pdf (supporting coal-linked hazards). 
77 Basic Information About Mercury, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/mercury/basic-informat 
ion-about-mercury. 
78 Id. 
79 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012). 
80 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact Sheet, Final Consideration of Cost In The Appropriate 
And Necessary Findings For The Mercury And Air Toxic Standards For Power Plants, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/20160414_mats_ff_fr_fs.pdf; 
See Wildlife Guide, http://www.nwf.org/Wildlife/Threats-to-Wildlife/Pollutants/Mercury-and-
Air-Toxics.aspx (“Coal-fired power plants are the single largest source of mercury 
contamination in the U.S., responsible for approximately 50 percent of human-caused 
mercury emissions. Other sources include waste incinerators that burn mercury-containing 
products and chlorine manufacturers. However, unlike these sources, power plants have not 
had to limit their mercury pollution.”). 
81 Mercury and health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, (Mar. 2017), http://www.who.int/ 
mediacentre/factsheets/fs361/en/.  
82 John Muyskens, Dan Keating, & Samuel Granados, Mapping How the United States 
Generates its Electricity, WASH. POST (July 31, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/national/power-plants/. 
83 Joby Warrick, White House Set to Adopt Sweeping Curbs on Carbon Pollution, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/white-hou 
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of electricity and in 13 states it supplies a majority of power generation.84 Half 
of the mercury detected in the ambient air in states in the U.S. is from the sources 
within that state’s boundary, while the other half migrates in from other upwind 
states.85 Human-made sources emitted about 115 tons of mercury, with 42 
percent of those tons (48 tons) coming from domestic coal-fired power plants.86  
Though power plants were not mandated by other EPA regulation to 
reduce mercury emissions per se, power plants indirectly are capturing about 
27 tons of mercury per year through the emission controls installed directly to 
reduce other emissions of the criteria pollutants nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, 
and particulate matter.87 If coal-fired power plants were not using control 
systems to lessen the emission of these other criteria pollutants, total mercury 
emissions would be about 75 tons per year.88 Mercury is categorized as a 
hazardous emission to the atmosphere that produces many adverse effects on 
human health. Congress lists mercury in the list of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 
which the EPA has an obligation to regulate under Section 112 of the Clean 
Air Act.89 EPA did so both under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, and then 
doubled down on the emission of mercury through promulgation of rules under 
its Mercury Air Toxic Standards.  
Due to the cost of regulation-mandated controls and the decreasing 
price of competitive fuels, the deployment of coal has been rapidly decreasing 
since 2010, so that it now supplies barely one-third of U.S. power.90 Five years 
																																								 																				
se-set-to-adopt-sweeping-curbs-on-carbon-pollution/2015/08/01/ba6627fa-385c-11e5-b673 
-1df005a0fb28_story.html. 
84 Muyskens, Keating, & Granados, supra note 82. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). See Mercury and health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, (Mar. 
2017), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs361/en/. (“Elemental and methyl-mercury 
are toxic to the central and peripheral nervous systems. The inhalation of mercury vapor can 
produce harmful effects on the nervous, digestive and immune systems, lungs and kidneys, 
and may be fatal. The inorganic salts of mercury are corrosive to the skin, eyes and 
gastrointestinal tract, and may induce kidney toxicity if ingested. . . . There are several ways 
to prevent adverse health effects, including promoting clean energy, stopping the use of 
mercury in gold mining, eliminating the mining of mercury and phasing out non-essential 
mercury-containing products. Promote the use of clean energy sources that do not burn coal. 
Burning coal for power and heat is a major source of mercury. Coal contains mercury and 
other hazardous air pollutants that are emitted when the coal is burned in coal-fired power 
plants, industrial boilers and household stoves.”). 
90 See Wendy Koch, EPA Seeks 30% Cut in Power Plant Carbon Emissions by 2030, USA 
TODAY (June, 3, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/06/02/epa-propos 
es-sharp-cuts-power-plant-emissions/9859913/ (demonstrating decreased popularity of coal). 
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ago, at the end of 2012 there were a total of 1,308 coal-fired generating units 
in the United States, totaling 310 GW of capacity. 10.2 GW of which was coal-
fired capacity that was retired in 2012, and more coal capacity has been retired 
each year since.91 Natural gas generation and renewable energy power-
generating capacity have been supplanting coal generation in the last five 
years.92 Sixty gigawatts of existing coal-fired power generation capacity will 
be shuttered between 2015 and 2020, with 90 percent of this coal decrease 
already occurring by the end of 2016.”93 U.S. coal-fired generating capacity is 
projected to decrease to 262 gigawatts in 2040, according to U.S. Energy 
Information Agency, which would constitute a 15 percent decrease.”94 
Next, this article examines the key Obama Administration MATS 
regulation, its impact, and how the Supreme Court came to find it in violation 
of federal law and remand it. 
 
B. Executive Branch Mercury Air Toxic Standards (MATS) 
 
1. The Rule  
 
Promulgated by EPA, the Mercury Air Toxic Standards (MATS) were 
estimated by EPA to “avert up to 11,000 premature deaths, 4,700 heart attacks, 
and 130,000 asthma attacks every year.”95 The final rule set standards for all 
hazardous air pollutants emitted by coal and oil-fired electric generating units 
with a generation capacity of 25 megawatts or greater.96 Promulgated pursuant 
to EPA’s authority under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act New Source Perfor-
mance Standards program and the Clean Air Act Section 112 Hazardous Air 
																																								 																				
91 AEO2014 Projects More Coal-Fired Power Plant Retirements by 2016 than Have Been Sched-
uled, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15031. 
92 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Natural Gas, Renewables Projected to Provide Larger Shares 
of Electricity Generation (May 4, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21072 
(demonstrating how natural gas and renewable energy have been replacing coal). 
93 Michael Bastasch, Report: EPA Regulations to Accelerate Coal Plant Shutdowns, THE 
DAILY CALLER (Feb. 14, 2014), http://dailycaller.com/2014/02/14/report-epa-regulations-to-
accelerate-coal-plant-shutdowns/. 
94 Id. 
95 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Healthier Americans, http://www3.epa.gov/mats/health.html. 
96 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/mats/basic.html; 77 Fed. 
Reg. 9,304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63). This affects larger coal 
plants, if coal is greater than 10 percent of fuel input, and the unit is greater than 25 Mw 
capacity, produces electricity for sale, and supplies more than one-third of its potential output 
to any utility power distribution system, unless its annual capacity factor is less than 8 percent 
of its capacity rating (i.e. only used for peaking purposes). See 77 Fed. Reg. at 9,309 
(supporting air pollutant standards). 
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [Aug. 2018 
 
 
124 
Pollution (“HAPs”) provisions of the Clean Air Act,97 MATS is specifically 
aimed at reducing power plants’ emissions of hazardous air pollutants, 
including arsenic, chromium, nickel, hydrochloric acid and hydrofluoric acid, 
in addition to mercury.98  
The rule provides existing electricity generators four years to come into 
compliance, with an additional year available to the power plants that FERC 
has deemed “reliability-critical,” i.e. essential to maintaining adequate power 
supply, voltage, and ancillary support for the nation’s bulk power system or 
restarting the electrical network in case of a blackout.99 MATS further provides 
that if a source cannot come into compliance within the timeframe allowed, 
EPA will determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether and to what extent it will 
assess fines or penalties for noncompliance.100 
 
2. The Discretion to Consider Economics of MATS 
 
EPA’s MATS regulation was challenged by Michigan and twenty-two 
other states along with some industry stakeholders, arguing that the EPA in 
promulgating the rule did not consider cost.101 In Michigan v. EPA, petitioner 
stated and other industry stakeholders argued that the EPA’s rules to control 
emission of mercury are unreasonable as the rule, according to EPA’s calcu-
lations, will require coal-fired power plants to spend about $9.6 billion with the 
direct benefit of only $4 to 6 million from the reduction of the directly targeted 
mercury.102 This approximates a 1:2000 direct benefit:cost ratio. EPA coun-
tered that cost is irrelevant in making a Clean Air Act rule.103 Whenever the 
statute is ambiguous, EPA’s argument was that it could interpret and resolve 
the ambiguity reasonably within its discretion.104  
																																								 																				
97 Clean Air Act §§ 111, 112, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412; 78 Fed. Reg. 24073, 24073 (April 
24, 2013). 
98 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact Sheet: Mercury and Air Toxics Standards for Power 
Plants, http://www.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/20111221MATSsummaryfs.pdf. 
99 Id. at 2.  
100 Id. 
101 Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2704. 
102 Id. at 2705-06 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 9326). 
103 Id. at 2706. See 76 Fed. Reg. 24988 (2011) (“We further interpret the term ‘appropriate’ 
to not allow for the consideration of costs.”); 77 Fed. Reg. 9327 (“Cost does not have to be 
read into the definition of ‘appropriate’”). 
104 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 (providing that the Court should accept EPA’s interpretation of 
the statutes while making rules, if EPA’s interpretation is reasonable and permissible 
interpretation of the ambiguous language when Congress’s intent behind the statute is 
unknown.).  
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EPA argued that it did not do an analysis of regulation-related cost 
because the language of the Clean Air Act does not explicitly require EPA to 
consider cost if it finds a new regulation “appropriate and necessary” after 
reviewing the results of study requested by 42 U.S.C. 7412(n)(1)(A).105 EPA 
argued that section 112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act does not mandate EPA 
to consider cost because the word “cost” does not appear in the Act, therefore 
without considering cost as a pre-requisite EPA can promulgate additional 
restricive rules if it finds such action “appropriate and necessary.”106 In other 
words, EPA can regulate mercury from coal-fired power plants whenever it 
subjectively deems it “necessary.”107 EPA also asserted that it is “appropriate” 
to further restrict mercury emissions because the technology is available and is 
in use by many power plants to reduce the emission of mercury.108   
Part of the EPA rationale is premised on the asserted ineffectiveness of 
prior EPA regulation. The EPA argued that the MATS rule was “necessary” 
because earlier regulation, particularly the EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution 
Rule (CSAPR),109 promulgated pursuant to other sections of Clean Air Act, did 
not deliver the anticipated reduction of emission of hazardous pollutants 
anticipated by the EPA, including mercury, and did not sufficiently reduce 
significant risk to public health.110  
 
C. Challenge in the Lower Federal Courts 
 
In 2014, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s MATS 
regulation.111 What also made the rule controversial is that the EPA counted 
assumed co-benefits associated with ancillary PM2.5 reductions, which were 
not covered by the MATS rule which regulated only mercury and hazardous 
																																								 																				
105 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (“The Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to public 
health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by electric utility steam generating 
units of pollutants listed under subsection (b) of this section after imposition of the requirements 
of this chapter. The Administrator shall report the results of this study to the Congress within 3 
years after November 15, 1990. The Administrator shall develop and describe in the 
Administrator’s report to Congress alternative control strategies for emissions which may warrant 
regulation under this section. The Administrator shall regulate electric utility steam generating 
units under this section, if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary 
after considering the results of the study required by this subparagraph.”). 
106 77 Fed. Reg. 9326. 
107 Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2705.   
108 Id. at 2706; 77 Fed. Reg. 9363. 
109 See infra Section III(E). 
110 77 Fed. Reg. 9310-11. 
111 See generally White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014), 
rev’d, Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699. 
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emissions, yet PM2.5 comprised the overwhelming majority of all ‘benefits’ 
attributed to the MATS regulations and counted by EPA.112 PM2.5 is already 
otherwise regulated by the EPA under other sections of the Clean Air Act.113 
This ancillary indirect “benefit” was not without design. The EPA designed the 
MATS rule, in part, to achieve through unilateral executive action PM2.5 
emissions reductions that otherwise it could not lawfully compel using 
provisions of the Act authorizing direct regulation of criteria pollutants, 
including PM2.5.114 
The Circuit Court of Appeals found that the MATS regulation was 
not arbitrary and capricious under the requirements of the Administrative 
Procedures Act because the EPA demonstrated a reasonable connection 
between its actions and the record of decision, and it was accorded Chevron 
deference to undertake actions.115 Judge Kavanaugh, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part in the Circuit opinion, took issue and agreed with the 
industry petitioners that the EPA unreasonably and illegally excluded cost 
considerations and economic impacts when determining whether the Clean 
Air Act Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) regulation of 
mercury and other power plant hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) was 
“appropriate and necessary.”116 
The NAAQS criteria pollutant standards for criteria pollutants in the 
statute specifically do not provide for considerations of cost, because the 
standard must be set by an ample margin of safety regardless of cost.117 By 
																																								 																				
112 Susan E. Dudley, OMB’S Reported Benefits of Regulation: Too Good to be True?, 
REGULATORY REFORM 29 (2013), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regu 
lation/2013/6/regulation-v36n2-4.pdf. 
113 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Particulate Matter, http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/particle 
pollution/ (Regulating PM2.5); White Stallion Energy Center LLC, et al. v. Environmental 
Protection Agency (12-1100), U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, http://www.chamber 
litigation.com/cases/white-stallion-energy-center-llc-et-al-v-environmental-protection-agen 
cy-epa-12-1100 (upholding Utility MACT). 
114 See White Stallion, supra note 113 (describing EPA re-designation of Clean Air Act). 
115 White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC, 748 F.3d at 1234. 
116 Id. at 1261 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent by Judge 
Kavanaugh stated that the majority over-read the ruling in Whitman v. American Trucking 
Association, Inc., by ignoring the important difference between how the Clean Air Act 
provisions govern NAAQS rulemaking compared to the MACT regulation of power plant 
HAPs. Id. at 1265–66 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 
Whitman majority held that the EPA may not take costs into consideration when setting 
NAAQS. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 467 (2001). 
117 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1). If an air pollutant is emitted by “numerous or diverse 
mobile stationary sources” and the associated air pollutant is “reasonably. . . anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare,” then pursuant to §108(a) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA 
must establish NAAQS for those pollutants, and pursuant to §109(b) of the Act, those 
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contrast, for MACT regulation of power plant hazardous air pollutants at issue 
in the MATS challenge, pursuant to §112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, contains 
more flexible language for the EPA making “appropriate and necessary” regu-
lation.118 When the D.C. Circuit Court upheld MATS applying to existing coal- 
and oil-fired electric generating units, it relied in part upon Supreme Court 
precedent in Whitman v. American Trucking Association, establishing that the 
EPA is under no obligation to consider costs in establishing HAPS under other 
provisions of the Clean Air Act that similarly fail to mention cost as a relevant 
consideration.119 On that issue the appellate court split; however, the majority 
deferred to the EPA’s technical judgment.120 
The power industry, the most capital-intensive in the United States,121 
cannot turn on a dime. Over the four years while MATS moved through the 
courts, many coal-fired facilities, not knowing whether the challenged regu-
lation would eventually be overturned, complied with the regulation that would 
later be stricken.122 Eventually, the rule was overturned and remanded by the 
Supreme Court123 after many coal-fired power generators in the nation either 
complied or delisted their plants to shut down rather than comply.124 
																																								 																				
standards must be “requisite to protect public health” with “an adequate margin of safety.” 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1). 
118 Id. at § 7412(n)(1)(A). See White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC, 748 F.3d at 1230–31 
(reinforcing notion that language within statute is more flexible); History, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/powerplanttoxics/ 
history.html (supporting flexible language related to regulation). This requires the EPA to 
study and issue a report on the public health hazards anticipated to occur as a result of power 
plant HAP emissions, and then apply MACT regulation “if” the Administrator finds such 
regulation is “appropriate and necessary,” which phrase is not defined. 42 U.S.C. 
§7412(n)(1)(A). 
119 White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC, 748 F.3d at 1238–39. 
120 Id. at 1239-40. This included challenges to the EPA’s determination of what was achiev-
able by the best performing 12 percent of sources (i.e., “the MACT floor”) and the supporting 
data. Id. at 1247-48. 
121 EDISON ELECTRIC INST., Delivering America’s Energy Future, (Feb. 8, 2017) http://www. 
eei.org/resourcesandmedia/industrydataanalysis/industryfinancialanalysis/Documents/Wall
_Street_Briefing.pdf (indicating that EEI members invest $120 billion in 2016 for capital 
investments in the electric power sector). 
122 See Suzanne Goldenberg & Raya Jalabi, US Supreme Court Strikes Down Obama’s EPA 
Limits on Mercury Pollution, THE GUARDIAN (June 29, 2015), http://www.theguardian. 
com/environment/2015/jun/29/supreme-court-air-pollution-epa-coal-plants (“According to data 
compiled by SNL Energy, many generators in the US complied with the mercury and toxics 
compliance, despite the possibility that the court would strike down the rule.”). 
123 See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Overturning and remanding MATS). 
124 See Patrick Ambrosio, Supreme Court Remands EPA Mercury Rule For Failing to 
Consider Cost to Power Plants, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 30, 2015), https://www.bna.com/ 
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D. The Elevation of Costs as a New Metric: Supreme Court Decision 
 
This MATS circuit court decision proceeded to the Supreme Court on 
appeal by a coalition of more than 20 states.125 In Michigan v. EPA, the 
petitioning parties overturned the EPA MATS regulation of mercury and other 
hazardous pollutants because: 
 
EPA must consider cost—including cost of compliance—
before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and nec-
essary . . . One would not say that it is even rational, never mind 
‘appropriate,' to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in 
return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.126  
 
EPA claimed long-term benefits of $37-90 billion annually, without 
providing any statistical basis or proof for its numerical determination. During 
oral arguments before the Supreme Court, several members of the Court were 
critical of EPA cost-benefit analysis which attributed most of these annual public 
health benefits to reduction of fine particulate matter and other pollutants which 
were not regulated under this MATS mercury standards, with only $4 to 6 
million in benefits resulting directly from reductions of the MATS-regulated 
hazardous air pollutants. The Supreme Court found that the application of 
“appropriate and necessary” must include considerations of cost.127 The majority 
opinion of the Supreme Court concluded that “it is not rational, never mind 
‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few 
dollars in health or environmental benefits.”128  
																																								 																				
supreme-court-remands-n17179928911/ (Coal-fired “Plants that were not granted an exten-
sion were required to comply with the standards by April 16, 2015, a deadline that required 
the installation of billions in pollution controls and factored into the closure of many coal-
fired power plants. Representatives from American Electric Power, FirstEnergy Corp. and 
other utilities told Bloomberg BNA in April that a Supreme Court ruling against the EPA 
would come too late to alter plans to close plants or invest in pollution controls.”). 
125 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705–06. The Court granted certiorari to, and consolidated three 
separate petitions filed by the Utility Air Regulatory Group, the National Mining Association 
and 23 states. Id. at 2706. Fifteen states supported the EPA’s MATS regulation before the 
Court. See generally Brief in Opposition, Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699, No. 14-46, 14-47, 14-
49, (Oct. 15, 2014) (Appellate briefs from various states). 
126 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (relying on Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. 
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)) (providing that an agency cannot 
entirely ignore an important aspect of the problem Congress tasked it with considering).  
127 ARNOLD W. REITZE, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
191-97 (2001). 
128 Clean Air Act §§ 172(a) (2), (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(a)(2), (c).  
Vol. 3:2]   Phantom Regulation 
 
 
129 
The Supreme Court held that “[in] addition, ‘cost’ includes more than 
the expense of complying with regulations; any disadvantage could be termed 
a cost.”129 EPA is required to “consider cost—including, most importantly, 
cost of compliance—before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and 
necessary.”130 Of paramount importance, the Court refused any longer to defer 
to EPA concerning the mercury standards. 
The Supreme Court did not uphold EPA’s rationale of its own complete 
disregard and ignorance of the cost of the MATS rule because it did not support 
that the rule is “appropriate and necessary.”131 The Court found that it will never 
be found “appropriate” if the return on the investment of billions of dollar is 
worth only a few million dollars in health benefit.132 Spending billions of dollars 
on one issue based on a rule which does not carefully consider the cost of the 
program would be a waste of useful resource; therefore any significant regulation 
may require the consideration of cost before the rule is promulgated.133  
Section 112(n)(1)(B) of the Clean Air Act, which applies to HAPs, 
requires the EPA to conduct a study to determine effects on health and environ-
ment from the emission of mercury from sources and consider the available 
technologies to control those emissions of mercury and their costs.134 Because 
Congress required EPA to perform this study of mercury emission impact on 
health and environment, EPA could not persuasively argue that Section 
112(n)(1)(B) of the Act allowed EPA to ignore cost in its broad exercise of 
administrative discretion under the Chevron deference doctrine.135 Although 
																																								 																				
129 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707. 
130 Id. at 2711. 
131 Id. at 2707 (citing State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2862) (indicating that when the agency’s 
actions are arbitrary and capricious and not based on relevant factors).  
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 2707-08 (citing Energy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1498 (2009)).  
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(B) (“The Administrator shall conduct and transmit to the 
Congress not later than 4 years after the date of enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990, a study of mercury emissions from electric utility steam generating units, municipal 
waste combustion units, and other sources, including area sources. Such study shall consider 
the rate and mass of such emissions, the health and environmental effects of such emissions, 
technologies which are available to control such emissions, and the costs of such 
technologies.”). When Congress references cost in section 112(n)(1)(B) and when EPA is 
regulating coal-fired power plants based on section 112(n)(1)(A), cost becomes a relevant 
factor in any rulemaking affecting coal-fired power plants based on section 112(n)(1). 
Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2708. 
135 Id. Cf. Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903, 916 (2001) (providing 
that while interpreting provisions of the Clean Air Act to publish ambient air quality 
standards with “adequate margins of safety,” the phrase does not require EPA to consider 
cost at all, but rather set the value of emissions of health affecting pollutants to a reasonable 
level such that it reduces the risk to health.). 
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other sections of the Clean Air Act expressly do not require EPA to consider 
cost while regulating sources other than power plants;136 it was found that EPA 
cannot ignore cost where Congress had intended the regulation of power plant 
emissions only when “appropriate and necessary.”137   
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the administrative record, 
created or not created by the agency, matters. While promulgating mercury 
emission standards, though EPA did some study to estimate the cost to the 
industry, that study was not in the record or the foundation or reason for EPA’s 
rule for coal-fired power plant mercury emission restriction. Thus, in Michigan 
v. EPA, by a Supreme Court split 5-4 decision, the circuit court opinion 
upholding the original MATS regulation was held illegal and remanded to the 
D.C. Circuit for redermination based on cost analysis.138 And here, the devil is 
																																								 																				
136 Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2709-10. While the section of the Clean Air Act regulating sources 
other than power plants does not require cost to be considered as a factor and concentrates 
on the amount of pollution from the regulated source, a separate section in the Act regarding 
power plant regulation makes reference to the consideration of cost as one of the factors 
among many, such as effect of pollution on health and environment, makes cost an important 
relevant factor that EPA cannot ignore.  
137 Id. at 2710; 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(3). 
Where EPA neither considered cost at all, “cost of compliance,” nor any findings from the 
EPA Regulatory Impact Analysis, none can play any role in EPA’s determination that 
electric generation units need to be regulated by a second, additional layer of rules, which 
render that MATS rule not “appropriate and necessary.” Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711. 
138 Id. at 2709-26. The Court majority decided that the EPA cannot find the MATS Rule 
“appropriate and necessary” when EPA has, in its own words, not considered cost at all when 
it determined that regulation of coal-powered power plants is required. Id. at 2711. The 
majority uses the metaphor of the purchase of a Ferrari by a customer who decided that it is 
appropriate to buy a Ferrari—a luxury and expensive automobile—but only considers the 
cost at the time of upgrade of its “audio system.” Id. at 2709. EPA’s action is similar to such 
buyer, who without consideration of cost, decides that it is appropriate to additionally 
regulate coal-powered power plants and will later consider the cost at the time of setting the 
limits of emission. The majority noted that the determination of a regulation to be 
“appropriate” cannot be validly made in the absence of a threshold cost consideration. Id. at 
2710-2711. The minority of the Court, however, interpreted the Clean Air Act § 112(n)(1)(A) 
“appropriate and necessary” finding by EPA to not necessarily require an EPA consideration 
of cost be the first step in the rule making process. Id. at 2724. The Court dissenters opine 
that the majority is at fault by ignoring the EPA’s act of finding that benefits such as about 
11,000 less pre-mature deaths per year and avoidance of many serious illnesses outweighs 
the cost of the regulation, after it has determined the regulation is “appropriate and 
necessary.” Id. at 2721. The dissent supports the EPA’s MATS rule because EPA, after 
deciding that regulation is required, has accounted for cost as part of the rule promulgation 
process setting the limits. EPA, based on its study, later concluded that the cost of the MATS 
regulation would be about $10 billion a year, and then comparing it against various benefits, 
with timing and cost as a threshold determination not important. Id. The dissent does not 
agree with the majority that the basic cost analysis must be the first step and the prerequisite 
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in the details: The Supreme Court did not requre EPA to perform a formal 
benefit-cost analysis.139 Rather the decision required the EPA to consider cost, 
without restricting the residual Chevron adminstrative deference as to how cost 
would be considered by EPA regarding power plants to be regulated by 
additional rules for mercury emissions.140 
Of note, in reaching its narrowly split decision in Michigan, the 
Supreme Court majority cited the dissent of Judge Kavanaugh in the D.C. 
Circuit decision in White Stallion Energy Ctr. LLC v. EPA,141 which on appeal 
became denominated as Michigan v. EPA.142 Judge Kavanaugh, as part of his 
confirmation process after nomination to the Supreme Court, expressly singled 
out his dissent in this case as one of the ten most important cases of his career, 
stating “the Supreme Court’s majority opinion agreed with and cited my 
dissent” in Michigan v. EPA.143  These dynamics take on larger context for the 
future longevity of Michigan v. EPA’s new direction in Constitutional and 
administrative law, given Judge Kavanaugh’s recent nomination to serve on 
the Supreme Court and the importance he attributes to his dissenting decision. 
 
E. Prior Regulatory ‘Benefit’ Precedent in Context: The SIP-CALL, 
CAIR, and CSAPR 
 
Three times over the past two decades, pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 
EPA has attempted to delineate the Act’s “Good Neighbor Provision” to 
prevent upwind drifting pollution to other downwind states by identifying 
																																								 																				
basis to find the regulation “appropriate and necessary.” Id. at 2724.  The dissent is satisfied 
if cost is the last step after EPA categorizing the power plants and determining to regulate 
the sources of pollution, beyond the floor level, at more stringent standard. Id. at 2726.  
139 A cost-benefit analysis quantitatively assigns monetary value to each benefit as a result 
of the rule and then compares the total benefit against the total cost. 
140 Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2711. Though the majority of the Court remanded the case to the 
D.C. Circuit for appropriate action for EPA to consider cost before finalizing a MATS rule, 
MATS was not vacated. Id. at 2712. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion notes that 
notwithstanding Chevron deference to the EPA to resolve statutory ambiguity if its 
interpretation is reasonable, it is the province of the court “to say what the law is” and not 
the agency. Id. at 2712. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (Standing for the 
proposition that it is the Court’s ultimate interpretive authority to “say what the law is”). 
141 White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699. 
142 See supra note 116. 
143 Fatima Hussein, Kavanaugh Touts Court Loss Among His Highest Accomplishments, 
Bloomberg Environment Reporter, July 24, 2018 (“In my view, it was unreasonable—and 
therefore unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act—for EPA not to consider the costs 
imposed by regulations in determining whether such regulations were ‘appropriate and necessary 
. . . . All nine Justices agreed with my position that the statute requires consideration of costs.”).  
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when upwind states “contribute significantly” to nonattainment downwind 
pollution. First, in 1998, EPA issued a rule known as the “NOX SIP Call” which 
limited NOX emissions in 23 upwind States to the extent that such emissions 
contributed to nonattainment of ozone standards in downwind States.144 The 
D.C. Circuit Court upheld the NOX SIP Call, specifically affirming EPA's use 
of costs to determine when an upwind state's contribution was “significan[t]” 
within the meaning of the Clean Air Act statute.145  
Second, the subsequent Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), promulgated 
by EPA in 2005, required 27 upwind states to reduce or eliminate the impact 
of upwind sources of pollution on out-of-state downwind nonattainment of 
NAAQS for SO2 and NOx.146 States comply by restricting fossil fuel-fired 
power plant emissions.147 The D.C. Circuit stuck this CAIR cap-and-trade 
regulation as “arbitrary and capricious . . . not otherwise in accordance with the 
law,” and “fundamentally flawed.”148 The court also struck CAIR on proce-
dural grounds, finding that the EPA failed to adequately explain how it 
determined state emissions budgets and to address provisions of the Clean Air 
Act that it was required to enforce independently.149  
Third, replacing the judicially-stricken CAIR, the Cross-State Air 
Pollution Rule (CSAPR) addressed interstate air transport of SO2 and NOx 
contributing to ground-level ozone and fine particle pollution.150 CSAPR, also 
promulgated pursuant to the “Good Neighbor” provision of the Clean Air 
Act,151 requires 27 states in the eastern half of the country to significantly 
improve air quality by reducing power plant emissions that cross state lines and 
																																								 																				
144 See NOX SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,358 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 51, 72, 75, 96) (Limiting NOx emissions in upwind states). 
145 Michigan, 213 F.3d 663, 674-679 (2000). 
146 North Carolina v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2008), modified, 550 
F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008). NOx and SO2 were reduced via the 1997 annual and 24-hour fine 
particle (PM2.5) and 1997 8-hour ozone NAAQS. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact 
Sheet: The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule: Reducing the Interstate Transport of Fine Parti-
culate Matter and Ozone 3 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/csapr/fact-sheet-cross-state-air-
pollution-rule-reducing-interstate-transport-fine-particulate (Reducing upwind state air poll-
ution sources). CAIR was intended to reduce or eliminate the impact of upwind sources on 
attainment of particulate and ozone NAAQS in downwind states. 
147 THE WHITE HOUSE, CUTTING CARBON POLLUTION IN AMERICA (2013), https://oba 
mawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf. 
148 North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 906–08, 918, 929 (citations omitted). 
149 Id. 
150 EME Homer City Generation L.P, 696 F.3d. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, U.S. EPA v. EME 
Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
151 Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)); 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,216 
(Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51). 
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contribute to ground-level ozone and fine particle pollution.152 CSAPR foc-
used, through addressing interstate pollution, on attainment and maintenance 
of the 1997 Ozone NAAQS, 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS, and 2006 PM2.5 NAAQS in 
reducing NOx and SO2.153 
The CSAPR rule is part of a suite of other state and federal rules that, 
together, would result in power plant emissions reductions of 73 percent for 
sulfur dioxide and 54 percent for nitrous oxide.154 EPA estimates that if all 
affected power plants were in full compliance with CSAPR, “[a]pproximately 
70 percent of the power generated from coal-fired power plants [in states 
covered by the rule would] come from units with state-of-the-art SO2 controls,” 
and roughly 50 percent of that power would “come from units with state-of-
the-art NOX controls.”155  
After the second EPA step of the CAIR cap-and-trade rule was stricken 
in 2008 by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,156 the D.C. Circuit Court struck 
CSAPR because of its flawed method for determining the emission reduction 
obligation imposed on states.157 On certiorari, EPA’s CSAPR rule was 
subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, overturning the D.C. Circuit.158 
The 6-2 opinion of the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s holding in 
2014, reaffirming deference to agency discretion in devising Clean Air Act 
regulations, and reinforcing Chevron precedent.159 
The majority’s ruling of the Court rejected the D.C. Circuit and 
Supreme Court dissenting Justices’ conclusions that EPA is foreclosed from 
relying on costs in making its determination, finding nothing in the statutory 
																																								 																				
152 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact Sheet: The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule: Reducing the 
Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone 1 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/ 
csapr/fact-sheet-cross-state-air-pollution-rule-reducing-interstate-transport-fine-particulate.  
153 Id. at 3. 
154 Id. at 2.  
155 Id. at 4.  
156 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,216 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51). 
157 EME Homer City Generation, L.P, 696 F.3d at 15-19 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, Envtl. Prot. 
Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
158 EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. at1596 (citing Chevron, 467 U. S. 837) 
(indicating that the EPA scheme for interstate cross-state pollution was “sensible,” “equit-
able,” “efficient” and “making good sense[.]”). The majority opinion included two key 
holdings: First, it held that the Clean Air Act does not require the EPA to provide upwind 
states a second opportunity to file a State Implementation Plan allocating in-state emissions 
before issuing a Federal Implementation Plan. Id. Second, the EPA’s Transport Rule, which 
allocates emission reductions based on cost effectiveness as opposed to the upwind States’ 
proportional contributions to downwind states’ pollution, was a reasonable interpretation of 
the Good Neighbor Provision of the Act and therefore entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 
1602-1610. 
159 Id. (citing Chevron U, 467 U.S. 837). 
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language that would preclude that cost consideration.160 It also disagreed with 
the D.C. Circuit majority’s conclusion that EPA was required to allocate respon-
sibility for emissions reduction in a manner proportional to each state’s 
contribution.161 “Nothing in the text of the Good Neighbor Provision propels 
EPA down this path.”162 Additionally, considering the “combined and cumulative 
effect of each upwind State’s reductions,” the majority found that the D.C. Circ-
uit’s proportional-reduction approach was neither practical nor mathematically 
feasible, and would ultimately lead to costly and unnecessary over-regulation.163  
Regarding cross-state pollution covered by CSAPR, 164 the Supreme 
Court allowed EPA, in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.,165 to 
perform “a cost-effective allocation of emissions reduction responsibilities.”166 
The Supreme Court decision in EME Homer contravenes the ruling in Whitman 
v. American Trucking Ass’n, Inc., which ruled against taking cost into 
consideration when establishing air standards:167 “The CAA [Clean Air Act] 
as a whole unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting 
process.”168 This applied to a different part of the Act which had the 
requirement to set a standard with an “adequate margin of safety.” The Sup-
reme Court overruled the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision, which 
asserted that the Act’s standard had no “intelligible principle” to help the EPA 
in establishing the NAAQS.169 
Based on the inconsistent and somewhat limited success between 1998 
– 2014 with these other three Clean Air Act regulations limiting power plant 
emissions, EPA promulgated its MATS rule which was estimated to have 
approximately $9.6 billion in costs annually versus a direct hazardous pollutant 
																																								 																				
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 1605. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1604-06. 
164 Clean Air Act, §§ 110(a)(2)(D), 126, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7426. The Act also 
establishes interstate transport commissions, and gives the EPA direct authority to order 
individual stationary sources to reduce emissions if they significantly contribute to non-
attainment in another state. Clean Air Act § 176A, 42 U.S.C. § 7506a.  
165 EME Homer City Generation, L.P, 531 U.S. 457. 
166 Adler, supra note 59, at 172-74. 
167 Am. Trucking Ass’n. v. EPA, 121 S. Ct. 903, 908 (2001). The courts have noted that costs 
can be considered in formulating the SIPs that implement and maintain NAAQS. See, e.g., 
Adler, supra note 59, at 173-74 (highlighting cost benefit analysis for agricultural pesticides). 
168 Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033–34, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
169 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001). See 
American Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), reh’g granted in 
part and denied in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (asserting that the Clean Air Act had no 
“intelligible principle” to help the EPA establish NAAQs).  
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public benefit of $4-5 million annually.170 Based on this modest direct benefit 
metric, the costs of complying with the regulation was somewhere between 
1,600-2,400 times more than direct benefits of reducing hazardous power plant 
air pollution. 
 
IV. THE ‘NEW’ MATH: WHICH COSTS COUNT WHEN THE COURT 
ELEVATES COST AS A NEW PRUDENTIAL RULE? 
 
Though EPA stated in Michigan v. EPA that it did not consider cost on 
the record while reaching its conclusion that regulation of coal-fired power 
plants of capacity more that 25 MW is “appropriate and necessary,”171 EPA, in 
fact, conducted a non-record study to find out the cost of the proposed MATS 
rule. The study concluded that the available health benefits, including fewer 
mercury-related IQ loss in development of children, avoidance of premature 
death of 4200-11,000 persons per year, reduced incidences of non-fatal heart 
attacks, reduced hospitalizations from cardiovascular and respiratory prob-
lems, and hundreds of thousands of lost productive work days, outweighed the 
substantial ongoing cost of almost $10 billion per year for compliance.172 The 
EPA did the numbers, but did not change its regulatory position: On remand, 
EPA evaluated cost metrics, considered public comments, and made findings 
that EPA’s regulation of power plants under MATS is justified.173  
																																								 																				
170 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705-06. 
171 See id. at 2707, 2712 (Supporting notion that EPA did not consider cost when reaching 
conclusions about coal power plants). 
172 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9306 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 60, 63). Table 2 
(Summary of the Monetized Benefits, Social Costs, and Net Benefits for the Final Rule in 
2016) provides the following: 
                                       [Billions of 2007 $] 
 3% Discount rate  7% Discount rate 
Total Monetized Benefits $37 to $90 $33 to $81. 
Partial Hg-related Benefits $0.004 to $0.006 $0.0005 to $0.001. 
PM2.5-related Co-benefits $36 to $89 $33 to $80. 
Climate-related Co-Benefits $0.36 $0.36. 
Total Social Costs $9.6 $9.6. 
Net Benefits $27 to $80 $24 to $71. 
 
173 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact Sheet, Final Consideration Of Cost In The Appropriate 
Necessary Finding For The Mercury And Air Toxics Standards For Power Plants (2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/20160414_mats_ff_fr_fs.pdf. 
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Presenting those numbers did not change what some saw as an 
imbalanced outcome: In its final Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for the 
MATS rule, EPA noted that the cost of the program is about $9.6 billion a year 
while the total direct and indirect benefits and ancillary co-benefits (from 
reduction of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter that were 
not the subject of the MATS regulation), is about $37 - $90 billion per year.174 
Almost all of the total benefits are from indirect so-called co-benefits totally 
unrelated to the regulated mercury chemical. In order to reduce mercury, 
operation of high-emission coal-fired power plants is suppressed by the MATS 
regulation, which also reduces emission of other pollutants. However, 
opponents of the rule claimed that EPA’s consideration of any co-benefit is 
faulty because this is double counting of indirect benefits with the actual direct 
benefits from what the rule expressly addresses.175    
 
A. Agency Choice of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 EPA’s initial study for cost analysis for setting the MATS rule was not 
without controversy.176 As noted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, EPA did not analyze all the options consistently or provide an estimate 
of total cost and benefit from each possible option.177 On the cost side of the 
ledger, EPA analyzed annual cost and benefit of the cap-and-trade program 
along with Clean Air Interstate Rule, but it did not compare technology-based 
options in combination with the Interstate Rule.178 EPA considered tech-
nology-based options separately for annual cost and benefit calculations, but 
did not consider cap-and-trade options separately.179  
On the benefit side of the ledger, EPA did not log the value of health 
benefits as a direct result of a reduction in mercury, or and how changes in the 
reduced mercury emissions will change the cost-benefit ratio for the tech-
nology-based options.180 The vast majority of the benefits that EPA counted 
																																								 																				
174 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY 
AND AIR TOXIC STANDARDS ES-1 (2011). 
175 IER President Releases Statement on New EPA Regs, INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY RES. (Dec. 21, 
2011), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/press/ier-president-statement-on-new-epa-regs/. 
176 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLEAN AIR ACT: OBSERVATIONS ON EPA’S COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ITS MERCURY CONTROL OPTIONS (Feb. 2005), http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d05252.pdf. 
177 Id. at 8-9.  
178 Id. at 8. 
179 Id. at 8. Cf. Ted Gayer & Robert Hahn, The Political Economy of Mercury Regulation, 
REGULATION, 2005, at 26, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20050708_ 
MercuryRegulation.pdf (Explaining technology-based options for cost-benefit calculations). 
180 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 176 at 12-13.  
Vol. 3:2]   Phantom Regulation 
 
 
137 
were from reduction from particulate matter and unrelated to the mercury 
which was being regulated by the rule.181 EPA did not consider some of the key 
uncertainties affecting its cost-benefit analysis.182 After remand in Michigan v. 
EPA, reviewing public comments both in favor and against the MATS rule, EPA 
conducted cost analysis based on four different metrics, and calculated that direct 
mercury benefits plus indirect co-benefits still outweighed the cost, concluding 
that the MATS rule is “appropriate and necessary.”183 
Mercury is listed as a Hazardous Air Pollutant in the Clean Air Act 
Section 112(b)(1).184 EPA proposed two options to control the emission of 
mercury from coal-fired power plants, which are the most significant source 
of mercury pollution.185 One of the options is the application of control tech-
nology, while the other is participation in a cap-and-trade option.186 However, 
EPA evaluated technology-based options alone, while the cost-benefit for the 
cap-and-trade program was examined with the separate Interstate Rule.187  
EPA estimated the cost of the technology-based options at approxi-
mately $2 billion per year with benefits of about $15 billion a year.188 Cost-
benefit from the cap-and-trade plus Interstate Rule was $3 to 5 billion per-year 
cost and $58-73 billion a year of benefits.189 Because the cost-benefit from the 
cap-and-trade option was considered along with the Interstate Rule, it does not 
help others to choose the correct option between the two available options—
technology-based or cap-and-trade.190 
 
B. The Algorithm: Dissecting Math 
 
Historically, EPA focused on percentage mercury reduction targets. 
EPA, in January 2004, had proposed a technology-based option to reduce the 
mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants by about 30% from the then-
																																								 																				
181 Id. at 4.  
182 Id. at 14. 
183 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,422 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63), https:// 
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20568&dis 
position=attachment&contentType=pdf. 
184 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 §(b)(1); Alexander F. Gruss, Mercury Removal from 
Simulated Coal-Fired Power Plant Flue Gas Using UV Irradiation and Silica-Titania 
Composites 11-12 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida) (on file 
with the University of Florida), http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0043294/00001. 
185 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 176 at 1.  
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 8. 
188 Id.  
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 9. 
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current 48 tons per year, to achieve a reduction to 34 tons per year by 2008.191 
In addition, EPA enacted the Clean Air Interstate Rule to reduce emissions of 
nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide, which also indirectly reduced mercury 
emissions to 34 tons per year by 2010.192 CAIR employs a cap-and-trade 
system to reduce nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide by 70 percent.193 
A clear comparison of costs was controversial. Since the reduction of 
mercury from the technology-based option and the Interstate Rule previously 
calculated by EPA is in the same range and EPA’s flawed study of both  
the options--not considering the technology-based option with the Interstate 
Rule and not considering cap-and-trade option alone—make comparison 
difficult.194 EPA also did not calculate economic benefits of mercury reduction 
alone.195 Because the direct benefits from toxic mercury were not estimated 
and all the benefits which EPA calculated and relied on to find the MATS rule 
“appropriate and necessary” were from the indirect reduction of the co-benefit 
non-toxic criteria pollutants of nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxides, and particulate 
matter as co-benefits, opponents alleged double-counting of co-benefits by 
EPA in disguise.196 Opponents of the MATs rule argued that EPA’s unconven-
tional counting likely exaggerated the benefits. 
 
1. Metrics and Cost: Agency and Stakeholder Arguments 
 
Back to the drawing board in present tense. EPA did an evaluation of 
the cost of the MATs rule based on four different metrics.197 The EPA first 
considered cost based on historical annual revenue and second based on annual 
																																								 																				
191 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 176 at 6. 
192 Id. at 7 
193 Regulations: Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), MARSULEX ENVTL TECH., http://www. 
met.net/clean-air-interstate-rule.aspx.  
194 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 176 at 8-9. 
195 Id. at 12. 
196 See Michigan v. EPA: Costs and Benefits Matter, U.S. SENATE (July 9, 2015), https:// 
www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/michigan-v-epa-costs-and-benefits-matter (explaining how 
opponents can use the case to argue that a federal court should delay implementation of the 
CO2 rule until all legal proceedings are complete). Chief Justice Roberts, with the majority, 
questioned the “dramatic disparity” between MATS compliance cost which EPA projected to be 
$9.6 billion dollars and any benefits due to the reduction in mercury and HAPs in the range of $4 
to $6 million per year. Id. The majority of the benefits are ancillary co-benefits as a result of 
reduction in criteria air pollutants. With no meaningful benefit from HAP control, it is a question 
“whether it’s an illegitimate way of avoiding the different limitations.” Id. 
197 80 Fed. Reg. 75, 025 (Dec. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63), https://www.regu 
lations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20497. 
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capital expenditure of the power plant industry.198 Third, EPA reviewed the 
impact of the rule on retail electricity prices, and fourth, considered any adverse 
impact on the power industry.199 EPA concluded that under each metric, the 
cost of mercury control is reasonable, and thereunder the power industry would 
be able to maintain its normal operation.200 EPA claimed that it did not receive 
any information that contradicts its finding of the cost to the program.201  
EPA noted that the MATS rule assists in the “prompt, permanent, and 
ongoing reductions in hazardous air pollutants” and the associated unquantified 
advantages to the “most exposed and most sensitive members of society” 
outweighs the cost.202 The EPA also conducted a formal benefit-cost analysis 
for regulatory impact analysis (RIA) and compared the cost against total direct 
plus co-benefits (monetized and non-monetized) to find that total benefits 
including adding in all co-benefits are substantial and outweigh the costs.203 
EPA estimated that the compliance cost of the MATs rule is approximately 
$9.6 billion per year.204  
																																								 																				
198 Id. at 75,032-34. 
199 Id. at 75,035-36. 
200 Id. at 75,036. 
201 Id. at 75,035.  
202 Id. at 75,030. 
203 80 Fed. Reg. 75, 025, supra note 197, at 75,039, 75,041. For formal Benefit-Cost Analysis, 
EPA in its economics analysis attempts to quantify all significant benefits derived from the action 
in monetary terms to determine whether the “action increases cost-effectiveness.” Id. The 
program is cost-effective if Willingness-To-Pay for an action by the people benefitting from the 
program exceeds Willingness-To-Pay to avoid the action by the people disadvantaged by the 
program. Id. By monetizing, i.e. assigning, a dollar value to each consequence, if the benefit 
exceeds cost, it improves economic efficiency. Id. OMB Guidelines and Executive Orders instruct 
agencies to consider both monetized and non-monetized benefits. Id; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, Fact Sheet, Guidelines for Prep-aring Economic Analyses, EPA-240-R-10-001 (Dec. 
17, 2010), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf.  
204 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Mats Base Case, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/ 
files/2015-08/mats_base_case_0.zip [hereinafter MATS Base Case zip files] (quantifying base 
case cost of rule); IPM Analysis of the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ipm-analysis-final-mercury-and-air-
toxics-standards-mats [hereinafter MATS Base Case excel files] (comparing Base case model run, 
including the national Title IV SO2 cap and trade program, NOX State Implementation Plan (SIP) 
Call regional ozone season cap and trade program, Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), and 
settlements and state rules through December 2010 impacting SO2, NOX, and directly emitted 
PM, and CO2, to results with MATs in place). EPA analyzed the impact of MATS on the U.S. 
electric power generation industry and followed version 4.10_MATS of the Integrated Planning 
Model (IPM) to compare the difference of the annual cost to the power industry with and without 
the MATS Rule with all costs and prices expressed in 2007-year dollars. MATS Base Case zip 
files, supra note 204, at mats_base_case_0.zip, mats_policy_Case_0.zip; MATS Base Case excel 
files, supra note 204, at MATS_Base_case.xls, MATS Policy Case.xls. The MATs Base Case 
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In response to the cost estimate, the electric power and the coal industries 
did not dispute the EPA cost.205 The Electric Reliability Coordinating Council 
(ERCC),206 Murray Energy Corporation which had been a signficant challenger 
to several EPA rules,207 Duke Energy Corporation,208 and National Economic 
																																								 																				
IPM includes in its determination of what criteria pollutant levels would be in the base case 
without MATS, the legal effect of the the Clean Air Act’s Title IV sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade 
program, nitrogen oxide State Implementation Plan (SIP Call) regional ozone season cap-and-
trade program, the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) as finalized in July 2011, and 
settlements and state rules through December 2010 impacting emissions of sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen oxide, directly emitted particulate matter, and carbon dioxide. MATS Base Case zip files, 
supra note 204, at mats_base_case_0.zip, mats_policy_Case_0.zip. According to the result of 
EPA’s IPM data run, the total cost to the power industry without the MATs rule is $144.25 billion 
in 2015, $155.32 billion in 2020, and $201.35 billion in 2030. Id. With the MATs rule in place, 
the cost to the power generator industry is $153.63 billion in 2015, $163.96 billion in 2020, and 
$208.74 billion in 2030. Id. The difference in cost with and without MATs in force was 
approximately $9.6 billion in 2015. EPA clarified that the annual $9.6 billion dollars required 
consists of annual production and capital costs to the power industry for the year 2015, and this 
represents the largest decrease of total annual output and capital cost of $31.8 billion dollars to 
the most significant increase of total of annual output and capital cost of $32.9 billion dollars. 81 
Fed. Reg. 24,431, 24,433 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
205 See NERA Economic Consulting, Energy and Consumer Impacts of EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.americaspower.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NERA-
CPP-Final-Nov-7.pdf (providing overview of Clean Power Plan impacts). NERA’s analysis 
projects that EPA’s Clean Power Plan will cost consumers and businesses as much as $39 
billion a year, far outpacing the costs of compliance for all EPA rules for power plants in 
2010 ($7 billion) and the annual cost of the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule ($10 
billion). Id. See BLAIR BEASLEY, ET AL., MERCURY AND AIR TOXIC STANDARDS ANALYSIS 
DECONSTRUCTED: CHANGING ASSUMPTIONS, CHANGING RESULTS (Apr. 2013), http://www. 
rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-13-10.pdf (demonstrating that ac-
tual regulations are more flexible than most models, which leads to a smaller impact on the 
electricity generating fleet).  
206 Jeff Holmstead, counsel to the Electric Reliability Coordinating Council (ERCC), testified 
before U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clear Air 
and Nuclear Safety, on April 17, 2012, that “EPA itself estimates that the cost will be roughly $10 
billion a year, but many experts believe the actual cost will be significantly higher.” Jeffrey R. 
Holmstead, Counsel, Electric Reliability Coordinating Council (ERCC), Review of Mercury 
Pollution’s Impacts to Public Health and the Environment, Before the Subcommittee on Clear 
Air and Nuclear Safety (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/663 
18c87-2b64-4c85-9a57-c569c6b61a5a/41712hearingwitnesstestimonyholmstead.pdf.  
207 Letter from Gary M. Broadbent, Assistant General Counsel and Media Director, Murray 
Energy Corporation to Administrator McCarthy, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=E 
PA-HQ-OAR-2009-023420536&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentT 
ype=pdf (“While $9 billion averages only $30 per person if that cost was evenly spread, you know 
that the costs will be very heavily concentrated on particular regions and communities.”). 
208 Letter from J. Michael Geer, Manager of Environmental Programs, Duke Energy Business 
Services, to the Honorable Janet McCabe, Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air and 
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Research Association (NERA)209 all submitted that they thought the EPA cost 
was within the correct zone of value. Some emission control companies which 
sell pollution control technologies that would be required to be purchased 
pursuant to the MATs rule, predicted that the cost of compliance would be less 
than EPA’s estimate due to the advancement of technology.210  
 
2. Absolute Cost 
 
On one level, there is the issue of absolute costs to industry compared 
to an esitmate of health and environmental benefits for the public. This is a 
comparison of economic expense and assumed health benefits. EPA’s MATS 
rule’s compliance cost is a a “small fraction” of the annual revenue of the 
power industry.211 Resources For the Future (RFF) estimated that MATS com-
																																								 																				
Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20550&attachmentNumber=1&disp 
osition=attachment&contentType=pdf.  
209 AMERICAN COALITION FOR CLEAN COAL ELECTRICITY, STATUS OF MAJOR EPA REGULA-
TIONS AFFECTING COAL-FIRED ELECTRICITY GENERATION (2015), http://www.americaspow 
er.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/EPA-Regulations-January-2015.pdf. 
210 See Brief of Emission Control Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
and in Support of Affirmance, Michigan v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 
14-46, 14-47, 14-49), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_ 
court_preview/BriefsV5/14-46_amicus_resp_ecc.authcheckdam.pdf (predicting that costs 
of compliance will quickly decrease once the market responds to regulations with novel 
solutions). FirstEnergy, a utility, determined in 2013 that its compliance cost for the MATS 
rule was around $465 million dollars across its entire generation fleet compared to its original 
estimate of $2-$3 billion. See Power Companies’ Declining Estimates of the Compliance 
Costs of the Mercury & Air Toxics Standards (MATS), MATS (2014), http://blogs.edf. 
org/climate411/files/2014/05/Declining-costs-of-MATS-compliance.pdf (“Annual operat-
ing expenses have been reduced through our continued focus on managing fuel costs and O&M 
expense. And more importantly, our projected capital spending in the generation group over the 
next several years has been reduced by more than $1 billion through our recent actions. This 
includes additional reductions in our expected spend for compliance with Mercury and Air Toxics 
Standards, which is now at $465 million across the entire generation fleet, with only an estimated 
$240 million at our competitive units.”). American Electric Power, another utility, also predicted 
that it can reduce the compliance cost as a result of technology improvements. See id. (“During 
2012 Q4 Earning Call, Nicholas K. Akins, CEO, AEP stated “We believe from a compliance 
standpoint that we can achieve further compliance reductions as a result of technology improve-
ments, but also how we run the generation.”). 
211 Revenue of the power industry from annual retail sales varies between $277.2 billion in 
2000 to $356.6 billion in 2008, rendering the compliance cost only 2.7-3.5 percent of the 
annual electricity sales revenue from the year 2000 through 2011. See Supplemental Finding 
That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and 
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 75033, Table 2 (proposed 
Dec. 1, 2015) (demonstrating compliance cost of MATS rule). America Electric Power 
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pliance cost will result in the reduction of industry profit of about $3-$5 billion 
in the year 2020.212 EPA also compared the compliance cost to the power 
industry’s annual capital expenditure during years 2000 through 2011, and 
found that the cost of MATS compliance is about 26 percent of this historic 
total annual capital expenditure of the power industry.213   
EPA concluded that MATS compliance costs were reasonable as the 
incremental compliance cost of $2.4 billion dollars in the year 2015 is “a small 
fraction – about 3.0 percent“ of the overall capital expenditure by the power 
industry.214 RFF, based on the HAIKU electricity market model,215 approxi-
																																								 																				
Company’s revenue ranged between $12.622-17.020 billion for years 2006 through 2015. 
See American Electric Power Inc, MORNINGSTAR (2017), http://financials.morningstar.com/ 
ratios/r.html?t=AEP; Duke Energy is spending about $525 to $625 million dollars over the 
period of 10 years for MATS Rule compliance (supporting Duke Energy spending). See 
MATS, supra note 210 (emphasizing that its revenue ranged from $12.720-$24.598 billion 
for 2006 through 2015). 
212 Dallas Burtraw et al., Reliability in the Electricity Industry under New Environmental 
Regulations, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (May 2012), at 2, http://www.rff.org/files/shar 
epoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-12-18.pdf. 
213 First Energy reported an estimated annual capital expenditure of $1.315-3.312 billion over a 
decade spanning 2006 to 2015. See FirstEnergy Corp, MORNINGSTAR (2017), http://finan 
cials.morningstar.com/ratios/r.html?t=FE (First Energy projected it would cost about $465 
million for its entire generation fleet, reduced from its original estimate of $925 million. However, 
the cost reduced due to the closure of plants rather than reduced costs of compli-ance, and focused 
effort on “managing fuel costs and O&M expense.”). Murray Energy Corporation, a privately 
held corporation, claims that for the Sun Electric System, representing five electric utilities in the 
Southeast, compliance will cost $12.5 billion, a 25% increase in the capital expenditure cost. See 
Broadbent supra note 207 (discussing how costs will be concentrated on particular regions and 
communities). Private sector power companies testified that subjecting power plants to Section 
112 would “result in capital expenditures of something like $12.5 billion for us, for a 25 percent 
rate increase . . . basically it triples the cost of compliance.” See Energy Policy Implications of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural 
Resources, 101st Cong. 7, 234–35, 240–41, 436–37, 483, 485, 492, 570–72, 596, 603 (1990) 
(providing the bipartisan hearing featuring testimony on various bills). 
214 For an estimate of the annual capital expenditures of the power industry at $120 billion 
annually, see Delivering America’s Energy Future: Electric Power Industry Outlook, EDISON 
ELECTRIC INST., Appendix A (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/indu 
strydataanalysis/industryfinancialanalysis/Documents/Wall_Street_Briefing.pdf.  
215 RFF’s HAIKU electricity model “simulates equilibrium in regional electricity markets 
and inter-regional electricity trade with an integrated algorithm for generation capacity 
investment and retirement and emissions control technology choice.  The model has been 
used for a number of reports and articles that appear in the peer-reviewed literature . . . 
calculates electricity demand, electricity prices, the consumption of electricity supply, inter-
regional electricity trading activity among 20 regions of the country, and emissions of key 
pollutants such as N0x, SO2, mercury and CO2 from electricity generation.” Maryland 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), CENTER FOR INTEGRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESEARCH (Aug. 4, 2011), http://cier.umd.edu/RGGI/modeling_details.html. See also 
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mated an annual capital cost for incremental investments for pollution control 
of about $5.1-$5.4 billion by the year 2020.216 RFF estimated that in the year 
2020, the incremental spending on new generation system would reach a 
capital cost of $25 billion without pollution control regulations such as MATS 
and CSAPR.217  
 
3. Derivative Regulatory Costs to Consumers 
 
A state Attorney General commented that the purchase of electricity is 
not a “discretionary” expense, and therefore impact on the customers of a price 
increase is “an important aspect of the problem” requiring due analysis to meet 
the directive of the Supreme Court in Michigan v. EPA.218 EPA considered 
changes in the resultant electricity rates billed to consumers.219 EPA’s MATS 
Regulatory Impact Analysis projected an increase in price of $0.003/kwh or a 
3.1 percent increase in average retail electricity costs.220 EPA noted historical 
electricity price fluctuations between $-0.0013/kwh to $0.0052/kwh for a 
period spanning the year 2000 through 2011.221 Using this historic range, any 
increase in electricity rates the consumer is paying is projected to be within this 
traditional range of price fluctuation in recent years.222 Over three-years of a 
MATS compliance period, EPA noted that the critical power generation 
reserve margin would be maintained as needed, and that demand for electricity 
would be unaffected while the power industry complies with the MATS rule.223  
RFF estimated a rise of about 1 percent in the national average 
electricity prices as a result of required MATS compliance costs, and no net 
impact on electricity prices from compliance with the CASPR rules.224 RFF 
																																								 																				
Anthony Paul, Haiku the RFF electricity market model (Jan. 11, 2011), http://cedmcenter. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Paul.pdf (PowerPoint on RFF electricity market model).  
216 Burtraw, supra note 212.  
217 Id. See also Supplemental Finding supra note 211, at Table 3 (listing total Capital Expenditures 
for the Electric Power, Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Sector, 2000 to 2011). 
218 Letter from Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General, State of Arkansas, to Gina McCarthy, 
Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations. 
gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20555&attachmentNumber=1& 
disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.  
219 Supplemental Finding, supra note 211. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at Table 4.  
222 Id. 
223 Regulatory Impact Analysis for Final Mercury and Air Toxic Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY (Dec. 2011), at 26, https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf.  
224 RFF infers that “forcing coal units to comply with the MATS SO2 standard or requiring 
SCR retrofits also decreases coal generation because of the retirement of coal-fired capacity,” 
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predicted that in regions where electricity is sold competitively, in about one-
quarter of the states, there would be no change in the electricity prices due to 
the MATS rule and a decline in Clean Air Act Title IV sulfur dioxide allow-
ances.225 In other areas characterizing the majority of states with traditional 
cost-of-service regulation, RFF estimated a price increase of about 2.5 percent, 
from $83/MWh to $85/MWh in the cost of retail electricity.226  
National Economic Research Associates (NERA) modeled impacts of 
MATS and CSAPR together and found that increase in electricity prices would 
be 11.5%, while “heavy manufacturing states” like Ohio could face from 
MATS an increase in retail price up to approximately 23%.227 EPA was 
criticized for not disaggregating the retail price of electricity price fluctuation 
data at a “smaller scale than nationally” in order to display some out-of-norm 
regional data.228 The Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) contended that  
the projected price increase of $0.003/kwh is double the average price increase 
for the eleven year period over which EPA collected retail pricing data– 
$0.0016/kwh.229  
Price increase due to the MATS rule, when added to the average stand-
ard price increase, was contended to be “far out of line with prior increases.”230 
UARG claimed that power generators retired because of the MATS rule are 
																																								 																				
but the reduction in electricity generation from coal is made up almost entirely by increased 
natural gas generation. Burtraw, supra note 212, at Figure 1.  
225 Id. 
226 Calpine Corporation, Exelon Corporation, and Public Service Enterprise Group, Inc. also 
supported the EPA’s estimated price change due to MATS is well within the price differences 
over the last many years. Id. “Actual data available in the years since EPA reaffirmed the 
Finding in 2011 support EPA’s conclusion about the reasonableness of projected retail 
impacts. Annual electricity price data are available from the EIA through 2014. The average 
retail electricity price was 9.33 cents/kWh in 2011, 9.04 cents/kWh in 2012, 9.10 cents/kWh 
in 2013, and 9.28 cents/kWh in 2014. Thus, the net change in average retail electricity price 
from 2011 to 2014 was a decrease of 0.05 cents/kWh, even while many sources were 
incurring costs to comply with MATS. Moreover, the year-to-year changes from 2011 to 
2014 – a decrease of 0.29 cents kW/h in 2012, then increases of 0.06 and 0.18 cents/kWh – 
were all well within the range seen in the prior decade. Thus, these more recent data also 
show that a 0.3 cents/kWh increase in electricity prices remains within the historical range 
of year-to-year variations and is reasonable.” Id.  
227 Letter from Paul A. Yost, Vice President of Energy and Resources Policy, National 
Association of Manufacturers, to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Aug. 4, 2011), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-176 
40&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (citing a report by 
NERA, which approximates the cost of compliance to be approximately $18 billion for 
MATS and CSAPR together, and the increase in electricity price to be about 11.5 percent). 
228 Burtraw, supra note 212, at 18. 
229 Id. (citing data available in Supplemental Finding, supra note 211).  
230 Id. 
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ten times the amount that EPA estimated.231 UARG contended that EPA’s 
comparison of the retirement of “coal-fired generation capacity” is arbitrary 
because each coal-fired power plant serves a unique purpose for the grid and 
EPA failed to include location as a factor affecting reliability and retirement of 
power generators.232 
 
4. Disputed Costs 
 
EPA stated in a Supplemental Finding issued in December 2015 that “no 
commenter provided any evidence or information that convinced the EPA that 
the preferred approach to consideration of cost is inadequate or unreasonable.”233 
Of note, Murray Energy Corporation (“Murray”), in its formal comments to 
EPA, listed multiple factors which EPA did not consider in finding the cost of 
the regulation was reasonable: This included omission of costs imposed on state, 
local, and tribal governments, impact of cost on particular regions, sectors, and 
entities, impact on dislocated workers from closure of old and small-capacity 
power plants, and the unique nature and characteristics of the power plant 
industry.234 Murray claimed that EPA, while considering cost under section 
112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, omitted any consideration of the cost under 
section 112(f) of the Act.235 Murray based this argument on the Michigan 
Court’s explicit order to EPA to consider the cost of compliance, which Murray 
asserted includes any potential cost of compliance with section 112(f) of the Act 
in 2020: Murray asserted that ignoring the cost of compliance in 2020, per 
section 112(f), is “the same reversible error” which led to the Supreme Court 
reversal in Michigan v. EPA.236 
Murray also alleged that EPA failed to consider the impact on state and 
local government public utilities providing public power.237 Murray commented 
that the Michigan Court required EPA to act reasonably238 to “prepare and 
consider estimates of the budgetary impact of regulations containing Federal 
mandates upon State, local, and tribal governments . . . before adopting such 
regulations, and ensuring that small governments are given special consideration 
																																								 																				
231 Id.  
232 Id.  
233 Supplemental Finding, supra note 211, at 34. 
234 Broadbent, supra note 207.  
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 See Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2708 (holding that the EPA acted unreasonably when it did 
not include cost consideration in its decision to regulate power plants).  
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in that process.”239 EPA countered these allegations of Murray regarding such a 
requirement by citing purported EPA authority under Clean Air Act section 
112(n)(1)(A), of “Congress’s open-ended instruction to the Administrator to 
determine whether a regulation of EGUs is ‘appropriate and necessary,’” and 
EPA’s conclusion that all monetized and non-monetized benefits outweigh the 
cost, given the balancing test articulated in Chippewa v. FERC.240  
Other commenters criticized the EPA cost analysis. The Director of the 
Ohio environmental agency stated that data used by EPA was flawed and 
outdated, and EPA should have done cost analysis “based on the actual data 
that included only the cost impacts on the portion of the industry actually 
affected by the rule.”241 ARIPPA, a non-profit trade association, after the 
																																								 																				
239 The increased cost will force local governments to raise local property taxes, and reduc-
tion in essential services will affect the real estate industry. Thus, while considering alleged 
health hazards and substantial potential reductions in HAPs, compliance costs, and “costs of 
mercury controls developed under the Mercury Study, costs of other HAPs controls, and the 
Acid Rain Program costs” and ignoring other factors, EPA’s cost analysis in not 
“meaningful” but in fact “arbitrary and capricious” because the alleged balancing efforts are 
“indecipherable.” See Makram B. Jaber and Elizabeth L. Horner, Counsel to the Utility Air 
Regulatory Group, Comments of the Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) In Response to 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and 
Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility 
Steam Generating Units, Before the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, (Apr. 17, 2012), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-205 
36&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. (citing Volkman v. 
Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1092 (7th Cir. 2013)) (providing a balancing test implicitly requires 
courts “to weigh factors against each other, rather than to merely count how many factors 
line up on each side—one factor of great weight may offset several which lean slightly in the 
other direction.”). The EPA’s proposed rule does not offer sufficient explanation as to the 
specific weight EPA gave to each variable or how they are considered in relation to each 
other, and should, therefore, requires formal Cost-Benefit Analysis for determining the rule’s 
“appropriate and necessary” justification. See Comments by the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ), Texas Railroad Commission, and Texas Public Utilities 
Commission Regarding the Proposed Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and 
Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal and Oil Fired Electric Utility 
Steam Generating Units (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?doc 
umentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20534&attachmentNumber=2&disposition=attachment 
&contentType=pdf (providing transcript of Texas Air Quality Commission’s Comments). 
240 Chippewa v. FERC, 325 F.3d 353, 357-59 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
241 When EPA restricted the public comments limited to the “consideration of cost aspect 
presented in the proposed supplementary finding” (80 Fed. Reg. 75028) and excluding 
“EPA’s use of identified environmental harms as a basis for finding it appropriate and 
necessary to regulate HAP emissions from EGUs” inter alia “EPA’s use of certified data 
submitted by regulated parties” and more, EPA failed to adhere to clear guidance from the 
Michigan Court. Letter from Scott J. Nally, Director, Ohio EPA, to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (Jan. 15, 2016) (on file with the EPA Docket Center), https://www.reg 
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Michigan Court decision asserted that “‘cost’ includes more than the expense 
of complying with regulations; any disadvantage could be termed cost.”242 
Many commenters insisted that EPA must perform formal benefit-cost analysis 
and should ignore any benefit that can not be measured in monetary units and 
should not count any benefits that result from the reduction of non-HAP 
emissions—i.e. EPA should not count ‘co-benefits’ of any reduced criteria 
pollutants which are not regulated by the MATS rule, which were indispensible 
for EPA to not have costs exceed direct benefits by more than 1000:1.243 
 
V. DISPUTED INCLUSION OF INDIRECT ‘CO-BENEFITS’ NOT THE  
SUBJECT OF THE REGULATION 
 
A. The Technology of ‘Co-Benefits’ 
 
If cost and benefit now matter legally, the math by which each is calcu-
lated determines the final cost-benefit tally and comparison. The algorithm and 
mathematical operations used to calculate costs and benefit are not without 
controversy. How one performs the mathematical operations can change and 
determine the result.  
Several members of the Michigan Court “were critical that the EPA’s 
cost-benefit analysis for the MATS rule attributed billions in annual public 
health benefits to the standards, even though the agency could only quantify 
between $4 million and $6 million in benefits to reduction of hazardous air 
pollutants.”244 Chief Justice Roberts questioned the legitimacy of counting 
																																								 																				
ulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20560&attachment 
Number=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.  
242 Letter from George Ellis, Executive Director, ARIPPA, to the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?document 
Id=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20535&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&con 
tentType=pdf. See also Michi-gan v. EPA: Costs and Benefits Matter, SENATE REPUBLICAN 
POLICY COMM. (July 9, 2015), http://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/michigan-v-epa-
costs-and-benefits-matter (providing background on cost benefit analysis related to 
Michigan court decision). The particular metrics chosen by EPA do not consider the 
disadvantages from the plant closure as a cost, but the closure of the plant is considered by 
EPA as impacting the reliability and availability of electricity and any interruption due to 
closure, ignoring other associated problems such as job loss caused by plant closures. See 
Broadbent, supra note 207 (discussing how costs will be concentrated on particular regions 
and communities).  
243 Jaber & Horner, supra note 239. 
244 Patrick Ambrosio, Supreme Court Remands EPA Mercury Rule for Failing to Consider 
Cost to Power Plants, BNA DAILY ENVTL REP. (June 30, 2015), http://www.bna.com/ 
supreme-court-remands-n17179928911/. 
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benefits from reduction of fine particulate matter and other pollutants that are 
regulated under other sections of the Clean Air Act.245 Is this the correct math 
if more than 99% of the assumed benefits are not related to what the regulation 
regulates? The EPA claimed long-term direct plus indirect co-benefits of $37–
90 billion annually, without providing any statistical basis or medical proof.246 
The only pollutant regulated, mercury, under the MATS rule imposed costs 
more than 1000 times that of the modest $4-6 million in direct benefits from 
reduced mercury. To change the outcome, EPA added in to the ‘benefits’ 
column additional economic value from other co-benefits of additional 
pollutants incidentally likely to be reduced when coal-fired plants could not 
meet the standard and had to cease operations.  
Worth noting, the Michigan Supreme Court decision does not require 
EPA to conduct formal cost-benefit analysis. The Michigan Supreme Court 
decision leaves the decision on how to account for cost to EPA: “[i]t [would] 
be up to the Agency to decide . . . how to account for cost.”247 OMB regulations 
expressly require agencies to apply cost-benefit analysis for regulations 
impacting the economy to the degree of magnitude that the MATS rule does. 
Therefore, EPA performed a formal cost-benefit analysis and again found that 
cost is substantially outweighed by the total monetized and non-monetized 
benefits, if and only if co-benefits are added, in its MATS RIA.248 On remand, 
after consideration of cost based on the four metrics, EPA found that total 
benefits of the regulation—monetized and non-monetized—ranged between 
$37-$90 billion per year compared to the cost of implementation of $9.6 billion 
per year. EPA reaffirmed its earlier finding that the MATS rule is appropriate 
and necessary when its cost is of this volume weighed against benefits, as 
required by the Clean Air Act section 112(d).249    
																																								 																				
245 Id. 
246 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706. 
247 Id. at 2311. 
248 Supplemental Finding, supra note 211, at 35. 
249 CAA Section 112(d)-Emission Standards, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (last 
updated Feb. 23, 2016), https://www3.epa.gov/airtoxics/112dpg.html. Some commenters 
like Exelon Corporation, Calpine Corporation, PSEG, National Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC), supported EPA’s selected metrics as the real compliance cost, which consists of 
amortized capital, cost associated with changes in fuel price, Variable Operating and 
Maintenance cost (VOM), and Fixed Operating and Maintenance (FOM) of MATS Rule as 
just $2 billion dollar instead of $9.6 billion dollar. See, e.g., Letter from Citizens for 
Pennsylvania’s Future et al., to Nick Hudson, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 
15, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-
0234-20558&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing 
commentary on EPA coal and oil regulations). The reduced cost is based on Andover 
Technology Partners’ analysis of compliance cost. Calpine agreed with EPA’s use of data 
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Drilling down a level deeper, this MATS reglation of mercury is 
expected to cause many coal-fired power faciities to either close or operate 
signficantly less, so all air emission pollutants they emit will be reduced from 
business-as-usual. Counting particulate matter and SO2 reductions, both of 
which are produced in abundance by coal-fired power plants compared with 
gas-fired power plants,250 and are not regulated by MATS, these comprise 
99.9% of the EPA-estimated co-benefits of the MATS regulation.251 When less 
than 0.001 of the benefit is related to what the rule regulates, whether co-
benefits can be included in the algorithm comes into sharp focus. Natural gas 
combustion produces significantly less emissions of CO2 and less of four of 
the six criteria air pollutants emitted from fossil-fuel fired power generation: 
 
• the amount of carbon dioxide produced by natural gas is about 
25% less than oil and almost half as much as coal 
 
• carbon monoxide (92 ppb emitted by natural gas compared to 
approximately 450 ppb for oil or coal) 
 
• sulfur dioxide (1 ppb for natural gas versus 1,122 ppb for oil 
and 2,591 ppb for coal) 
 
• almost no nitrogen oxides from natural gas compared to burn-
ing other fossil fuels  
 
• almost no particulate matter from natural gas, unlike other 
fossil fuels252 
																																								 																				
during the initial promulgation of the rule instead of using the recent data available during 
the three years of the compliance period arguing that the current data may be not available 
to EPA during the time for rule finalization. See Comments of Calpine Corporation, Exelon 
Corporation, And Public Service Enterprise Group, Inc. on U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Proposed Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate 
Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- And Oil- Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units 
(December 1, 2015) (on file with EPA Docket), https://www.regulations.gov/content 
Streamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20549&attachmentNumber=1&disposition 
=attachment&contentType=pdf. (“Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized that only a 
‘preliminary estimate’ of cost would be available to the Agency at the time the listing 
decision is made. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711.”).  
250 See Ferrey, supra note 73 (stating that coal-fired emissions exceed emissions for natural 
gas-fired power facilities). 
251 Krauss, supra note 8; Jaber & Horner, supra note 239. 
252 Ferrey, supra note 62, at 595-596. 
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Due to larger economic factors unrelated to, and predating, the MATS 
rule, gas and coal were exchanging their positions of fuel dominance. From 
2006 to 2012, prior to impact of either MATS and the Clean Power Plan, gas 
use increased 25%, moving from providing 20% of America’s electricity to 
nearly 25%, with coal declining from more than half the source for power a 
few years before to 36% in 2012.253 Coal-fired generation has decreased to 
now approaching ever closer to 30% of power production.254 These changing 
roles have continued: During the first half of 2016, natural gas supplied 36 
percent of U.S. electricity generation, while coal supplied 31 percent.255 The 
respective shares of different sources of U.S. electricity are shown in Figure 2.  
 
FIGURE 2: 
 
 
																																								 																				
253 Gas Works: Shale Gas is giving a big boost to America’s Economy, THE ECONOMIST (July 
14, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21558459. 
254 Stephen Lacey, U.S. Coal Generation Drops 19 Percent In One Year, Leaving Coal 
with 36 Percent Share of Electricity, THINK PROGRESS (May 14, 2012), https://thinkpro 
gress.org/u-s-coal-generation-drops-19-percent-in-one-year-leaving-coal-with-36-percent 
-share-of-electricity-4b06091d4cde/ 
255 Marie Cusick, Coal may outpace natural gas in electric power generation this winter, 
STATE IMPACT (Nov. 23, 2006), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2016/11/23/coal-
may-outpace-natural-gas-in-electric-power-generation-this-winter/. 
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B. Counting Outside the Section 112 Lines: The Weight, if any, of  
Non-Hazardous Pollutants 
 
The key question raised in Michigan is whether it is legitimate in com-
paring costs and benefits of a particalar regulation to count co-benefits from 
reduction of pollutants that are not regulated by the particular rule. The Supreme 
Court has yet to answer. Stated in the dimension of technology, if rather than try 
to order through energy regulation that coal plant operation be diminished, one 
does so indirectly through environmental regulation of the emissions from coal-
fired facilities, can the ‘benefit’ side of the ledger count items that are not regu-
lated on the cost side of the ledger? And beyond the issue of counting co-benefits, 
can one assume credit to a regulation for changes in technology, fuels, and 
emissions being driven by economic forces rather than by regulation?  
In a defensive posture, EPA, however, in the Michigan case claimed it 
did not consider co-benefits at all, but it was the substantial risks associated with 
the emission of mercury and HAPs from electric generation unit power facilities 
that supported EPA’s findings of the reasonableness of the EPA’s preferred appr-
oach.256 It also argued that co-benefits should be counted in the quantitative bene-
fits.257 In support of why the co-benefits should be considered, EPA argued that: 
 
Because the co-benefits are a direct consequence of actions to 
reduce HAP emissions, are consistent with economic guidance 
documents, and are consistent with statutory requirements in 
CAA [Clean Air Act] Section 112(n)(1)(A), it would be unreas-
onable for the EPA to ignore co-benefits in the comparison of 
monetized benefits to monetized costs for MATS.258 
																																								 																				
256 Supplemental Finding, supra note 211, at 47-50. MIT Institute for Data, System and Society 
predicted, based on the study to estimate the benefits of U.S. (MATS) and global (United Nations 
Minamata Convention) mercury policy for U.S. populations, including consumers of self-caught 
freshwater fish and consumers of commercial marine and estuarine fish in the U.S. market that 
“compared to a scenario without additional mercury and air pollution controls, MATS could yield 
cumulative lifetime benefits for individuals affected by 2050 of $147 billion (2005 USD, 
discounted at 3%), and cumulative economy-wide benefits realized by 2050 of $43 billion (2005 
USD, discounted at 3%). Sensitivity scenarios addressing uncertainties and variability in mercury 
chemistry, and ecosystem and human responses, led to a range of $625 million to $225 billion in 
lifetime benefits, and $4.1 million to $66.2 billion in economy-wide benefits.” See Letter from 
Amanda Giang et al., Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, MIT, to Dr. Nick Hutson, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStream 
er?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20544&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attach 
ment&contentType=pdf (providing researchers’ comments on EPA’s coal and oil regulations).   
257 Id. 
258 Id.  
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EPA submitted that any “proper and complete” benefit analysis must 
factor in all the pollution reduction of any kind when regulating under section 
112(d) of the Clean Air Act which controls power plant hazardous emis-
sions.259 EPA submitted that the inclusion of indirect benefits is consistent with 
Executive Orders and guidance of OMB.260 Many stakeholder commenters to 
the proposed and remanded regulation disagreed. 
The Texas Commission on Environment Quality (TCEQ) objected to 
counting co-benefits from particulate matter and sulfur dioxide emission 
reductions because they are covered under a different section of the Clean Air 
Act than the section involved with the MATS rule, and are not listed under the 
relevant section 112(b) of the Act as HAPs.261 Opponents of the EPA rule 
highlighed the purpose of section 112 of the Act “to achieve prompt, perma-
nent, and ongoing reductions in HAP emissions from stationary sources.”262 
They argued that it is only “logical” to consider only benefits of HAP emission 
reduction while considering cost incurred for HAP emission reduction.263 
One concern expressed was the weight that co-benefits play in the total 
calculation. Analysis of thirty-seven peer-reviewed studies of air quality co-
benefits indicates that the co-benefits play a smaller role in the calculation of 
stringent pollution emission standards.264 Considering co-benefits reduces “the 
																																								 																				
259 See Citizens for Pennsylvania, supra note 249 (providing commentary on EPA coal and 
oil regulations).  
260 Supplemental Finding, supra note 211. See, e.g., Memorandum from George P. Shulz, 
Director, Office of Management and Budget, for the Heads of Departments and Agencies: 
Agency regulations, standards, and guidelines pertaining to environmental quality, consumer 
protection, and occupational and public health and safety (Oct. 5, 1971), http://www.thecre. 
com/ombpapers/QualityofLife1.htm (establishing a procedure that included including costs and 
benefits on proposals in order to improve the interagency coordination); Exec. Order No. 12044, 
43 C.F.R. 12661 (Mar. 24, 1978) (executive order by Jimmy Carter directing each Executive 
Agency to adopt procedures to improve existing and future regulations); Exec. Order No. 12291, 
46 C.F.R. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (executive order by Ronald Reagan stating that regulations 
should only be enacted if the potential benefits to society outweigh the potential costs to society); 
Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 C.F.R. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (executive order by Bill Clinton urging 
agencies to weigh the costs and benefits of policy alternatives).  
261 Comments of Texas Commission, supra note 239.  
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 See C. Boyden Gray, EPA’s Use of Co-Benefits, 16 Engage: J. Federalist Soc'y Prac. 
Groups 31 (2015) (expressing concern that the vast majority of co-benefits derive from a 
questionable metric that estimates reductions of premature mortality associated with policy 
changes); Nemet et al., Implications of incorporating air-quality co-benefits into climate 
change policymaking, 5 Environ. Res. Lett (2010) (finding that “full inclusion of co-benefits 
depends on—rather than substitutes for—better valuation of climate damages”).  
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societal cost of climate policy,” or interpreted from the alternative perspective, 
justifies rigorous climate change regulations “by increasing the avoided socie-
tal damages” which are counted as ‘benefits.’265 Even when damages are the 
main driving force behind any environmental policy regulations, such damages 
are not generally included in the assessment due to distrust over the reliability 
of environmental impact studies.266 In the cases when the co-benefits are 
greatly appreciated as substantial, valuation of earlier loss of life becomes 
difficult and could make a significant difference in the total benefits counted, 
with or without co-benefits.267  
The tail wags the dog with the MATS regulations remanded by the 
Supreme Court: Reduction of particulate matter, itself not a toxic pollutant, 
occurring coincidently through the asumed closure of coal-fired plants which 
could not cost-effectively meet the MATS rule, due to emission regulation only 
of mercury, were forecast to reduce the premature mortality from particulate 
matter in the air by about 98%, becoming the greatest monetized ‘benefit’ in 
the MATS benefit protocol.268 This co-benefit value becomes significant based 
																																								 																				
265 Id. 
266 See WILLIE SOON, A SCIENTIFIC CRITIQUE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S 
“NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS [NESHAP] FROM 
COAL- AND OIL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING UNITS AND STANDARDS OF 
PERFORMANCE FOR FOSSIL-FUEL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY, INDUSTRIAL-COMMERCIAL 
INSTITUTIONAL, AND SMALL INDUSTRIAL-COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONAL STEAM GENERATING 
UNITS (2011) (“The EPA proposal neglects key scientific knowledge and many peer-
reviewed papers that suggest there is no straightforward connection between mercury (Hg) 
emissions from power plants or other man-made sources to the mercury level in fish. There 
is little doubt that levels of the biologically active form of mercury, methyl-mercury (MeHg) 
that are ultimately accumulating in fish tissue depends primarily upon environmental and 
ecosystem factors such as amounts of sulfate, sunlight and organic matter, pH level, water 
temperature, and amounts of bacteria or zooplankton. MeHg levels in fish do not depend 
simply on the amount of elemental Hg available for conversion. This is why a distinguished 
group of mercury science experts 7 concluded that a simple change in bacterial activity alone 
could cause an increase in fish mercury concentrations, even as atmospheric deposition 
[from industrial mercury emission sources] decreases.’”).  
267 Id. 
268 Gray, supra note 264, at 31. See also Ambient (outdoor) air quality and health, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/ (“A 2013 
assessment by WHO’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) concluded that 
outdoor air pollution is carcinogenic to humans, with the particulate matter component of air 
pollution most closely associated with increased cancer incidence, especially cancer of the 
lung. An association also has been observed between outdoor air pollution and increase in 
cancer of the urinary tract/bladder. Ambient (outdoor air pollution) in both cities and rural 
areas was estimated to cause 3.7 million premature deaths worldwide per year in 2012; this 
mortality is due to exposure to small particulate matter of 10 microns or less in diameter 
(PM10), which cause cardiovascular and respiratory disease, and cancers.”). 
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on the estimated “value per statistical life” assumed to be saved by less par-
ticulate matter emissions to the ambient air, although it was noted by 
commenters that the the EPA-assigned value disregards the age of the person, 
inter alia the earning capacity of the individual, and the person’s potential 
contribution to society.269  
Commenters noted that such a method of measuring co-benefits in 
monetary value was questionable since “significant uncertainty remains” 
regarding “the reduction of premature deaths associated with a reduction in 
particulate matter and … the monetary value of reducing mortality risk.”270 
The existing particulate matter standards are otherwise already established by 
another section of the Clean Air Act to already protect human health with “an 
adequate margin of safety.”271 Of note, the Supreme Court, in another matter, 
held that different sections of the Clean Air Act are distinct and separate, such 
that EPA can adopt fundamentally different interpretations of identical 
Congressional language used in both sections.272 
Historic perspective and practice: Notwithstanding stakeholder 
criticisms of the MATS rule methodology, EPA’s use of co-benefits in the 
‘benefits’ calculation has been the EPA practice in the past.273 However, the 
																																								 																				
269 Gray, supra note 264. 
270 Id.  
271 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1). 
272 Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007) (providing that the 
EPA can define “modification” differently in sections 110 and 111 of the Clean Air Act).  
273 Joint Statement by Inst. for Policy Integrity at NYU Law School to EPA (Jan. 15, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-205 
38&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. “Moreover, EPA—
under presidents of both parties and across four decades—has consistently taken indirect 
benefits into account when evaluating Clean Air Act regulations. For example, when 
proposing to develop New Source Performance Standards for municipal waste combustors, 
EPA under President Reagan explained that it intended to ‘consider the full spectrum of the 
potential impacts of regulation,’ including ‘indirect benefits accruing from concomitant 
reductions in other regulated pollutants.’ Similarly, in proposing performance standards for 
landfill gases, EPA under President George H.W. Bush justified the regulation partly by 
reference to ‘the ancillary benefit of reducing global loadings of methane.’ EPA under 
President Clinton analyzed the indirect benefits of reducing co-pollutants like volatile 
organic compounds, particulate matter, and carbon monoxide from emissions standards 
addressing hazardous pollutants from pulp and paper producers. In promulgating a rule on 
mobile source air toxics, EPA under President George W. Bush noted, ‘Although ozone and 
[particulate matter] are considered criteria pollutants rather than “air toxics,” reductions in 
ozone and [particulate matter] are nevertheless important co-benefits of this proposal.’ 
Finally, EPA under President Obama considered the indirect benefits from reducing carbon 
monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and nitrogen oxides in its analysis of regulating 
hazardous air pollutants from combustion engines.” (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 25,399, 25,406 (July 
7, 1987); 56 Fed. Reg. 24,468, 24,469 (May 30, 1991); 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,585–86 (Apr. 
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influence of such co-benefits has never been so profound in influencing the 
ultimate balance and outcome of the cost-benefit calculation for recent 
regulations: The immense cost in the billions of dollar for the emission control 
programs for greenhouse gas reduction under the Clean Power Plan274 and 
MATS swamp by one-thousand times the direct ‘benefit’ from the targetted 
emission controlled, which is valued at less than six million dollars.  
Benefits only exceed costs by counting co-benefits from the reduced 
amounts of other chemicals that are linked to mortality incidences. Particulate 
matter is not a hazardous chemical and is a criteria pollutant separately 
controlled to an “adequate margin of safety”275 under a different section of the 
Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards, under which it is not 
an objective to minimize emissions of criteria pollutants.276 As EPA noted in 
its MATS RIA:  
 
NAAQS are not set at a level of zero risks. Instead, the NAAQS 
reflect the level determined by the Administrator to be 
protective of public health within an adequate margin of safety, 
taking into consideration effects on susceptible populations. 
While benefits occurring below the standard may be less certain 
than those occurring above the standard, EPA considers them 
to be legitimate components of the total benefits estimate.277  
 
The NAAQS for criteria pollutants, like NOx, already are set at suppo-
sedly safe levels, based on the science. The EPA reevaluates the NAAQS every 
five years set according to “air quality criteria [that] shall accurately reflect the 
latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifi-
able effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence 
of such pollutant in ambient air, in varying quantities.”278 Separately, EPA, 
																																								 																				
15, 1998); 72 Fed. Reg. 8428, 8430 (Feb. 26, 2007); 75 Fed. Reg. 51,570, 51,578 (Aug. 20, 
2010)). 
274 See Gray, supra note 264. 
275 The EPA must establish NAAQS for pollutants; pursuant to §109(b) of the Clean Air Act, 
those standards must be “requisite to protect public health” with “an adequate margin of 
safety.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1). 
276 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1) (Statutes providing air quality criteria and control 
techniques). 
277 U.S. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, EPA-
452/R-11-011 (Dec. 2011), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf. 
278 Susan E. Dudley, Supp. Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous 
Air Pollution from Coal and Oil-Fired Elec. Utility Steam Generating Units (Jan. 11, 2016), https:// 
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20527&attac 
hmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (citing Clean Air Act §108(a)(2). 
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based on the guidance of its science advisory panel, proposed revisions of the 
NAAQS for particulate matter to be reduced for all Air Quality Control Re-
gions in the country to 12 µg/m3 from the prior standard of 15 µg/m3 to 
preserve an adequate margin of safety. This is a 20% tightening of the PM 
emissions standard. In 2013, the EPA “tightened the annual, health-based 
national ambient air quality standard for fine particles, which had been set at 
15 micrograms per cubic meter.”279 The EPA retained its daily PM2.5 standard 
of 35 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) set in 2006.280  
 
C. The ‘New Math’ of ‘Co-Benefits’ 
 
The states, stakeholders, and the scientific community are split on the 
inclusion or non-inclusion of incidental co-benefits in any cost-benefit calcu-
lation or algorithm for federal environmental regulations. With regard to 
another Obama Administration regulation, the Clean Power Plan also counts a 
very large amount of co-benefits from reduction of other than its expressly and 
solely targeted CO2, and counts many international climate benefits in proportion 
to relatively limited domestic climate benefits, evaluated against its substantial 
future domestic compliance costs.281 
Former EPA Administrator Mike Leavitt stated "cleaning the air gets 
more difficult as the maximum benefits from existing rules are achieved and 
the low-hanging fruit is gone.”282 Any new regulations would be costlier to 
implement, and any cost-benefit justification of the rule requiring high cost of 
implementation with very little direct benefit will require the inclusion of air 
quality co-benefits to make the rule cost-effective. When the co-benefits counted 
are greater than the benefits, as with each of the unilateraly promulgated EPA 
																																								 																				
“The Supreme Court has confirmed EPA’s interpretation that this statutory language precludes 
consideration of any impacts other than direct health effects from exposure to the pollutant.” Id. 
at 4 n.8.  
279 Patrick Ambrosio, 14 Areas Don’t Meet Air Quality Standard for Fine Particulates, EPA 
Says in Proposal, 45 ENV’T REP. 2517 (BNA) (Aug. 28, 2014). EPA revised the annual 
primary PM2.5 NAAQS to 12 µg/m3 from the previous level of 15 µg/m3 on Dec 14, 2012. 
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REVISED AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR 
PARTICLE POLLUTION AND UPDATES TO THE AIR QUALITY INDEX (AQI) 1 (2012). 
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/particlepollution/2012/decfsstandards.pdf. 
280 Id. 
281 See Andrew M. Grossman, Michigan v. EPA: A Mandate for Agencies to Consider Costs, 
2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 281, 306–07 (2015) (providing scholarly commentary on Mich-
igan case). 
282 Cynthia Bergman, 2003 Status Report Shows U.S. Air Cleanest Since 1970, EPA (Sep. 9, 
2004), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/d13d7cbd4048f16e85256f1700536aaf? 
OpenDocument. 
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Clean Power Plan and MATS rules, the co-benefits are no longer incidental 
mathematically. The co-benefits change the results from costs that far exceed 
the direct benefits, to thereafter flip the outcome when all incidental co-benefits 
plus direct benefits exceed costs. Co-benefits are a game changer for the 
environment and climate policy. 
EPA’s position regarding the MATS rule is:283 
 
• the statutory language of section 112(n) of the Clean Air Act 
on hazardous pollutants does not explicitly prohibit consid-
eration of co-benefits; 
 
• the ruling of the Supreme Court in Michigan does not explicitly 
prohibit particulate matter and sulfur dioxide co-benefits 
inclusion in calculations of the net benefits of hazardous 
substance regulation; and 
 
• recognition of “collateral benefit of controlling criteria pollu-
tants” in the legislative history of Clean Air Act section 
112(d)(2) is Congress’s implicit indirect permission to include 
such ancillary co-benefits in a cost-benefit calculation.  
 
Attorney-Generals from fifteen states supported EPA’s inclusion of co-
benefits from pollutants not controlled under section 112 of the Act.284 EPA in 
its rule-specific Regulatory Impact Analysis for MATS mentions the steps it 
has taken to avoid double-counting of benefits.285 EPA, denying the allegation 
of double-counting levelled against it, stated: 
																																								 																				
283 See 135 S.Ct. at 2711 (“Even if the Agency could have considered ancillary benefits when 
deciding whether it is appropriate and necessary – a point we need not address – it plainly 
did not so here.”); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (regulating hazardous air pollutants); 
Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air 
Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, page 98-99 
(citing S. Rep. No. 101-228, 101st Cong. 1st sess. at 172). 
284 See Joint Statement by Fifteen State Attorney Generals to EPA (Jan. 15, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-205 
51&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing statem-
ent from Attorney Generals to EPA). 
285 See also U.S. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics 
Standards, EPA-452/R-11-011 (Dec. 2011), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/mats 
riafinal.pdf., at page 110 (“To avoid double-counting benefits from reductions in myocardial 
infarctions when applying the impact function for cardiovascular hospital admissions, we first 
adjusted the baseline cardiovascular hospital admissions to remove admissions for myocardial 
infarctions.”). “To prevent double-counting, we focused the estimation on asthma exacerbations 
occurring in children and excluded adults from the calculation.” Id. at 113. 
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[s]tandard practice for its rules is to estimate, to the extent data 
and time allow, all benefits of the emissions reductions 
achieved by a rule beyond control requirements for other rules. 
If this rule was duplicative with other rules, then there would 
be no additional costs or benefits attributable to this rule.286 
 
EPA claimed that in its MATS analysis it includes “rules such as Cross-
State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) in the ‘baseline’ in estimating the benefits 
and costs of rules like MATS.”287 EPA claimed that any emission reduction as 
a result of MATS are additional reductions and hence not counted twice; 
likewise benefits of particulate matter reduction per the MATS rule are not 
counted with the estimated benefits of the NAAQS RIA.288 So, alleged double-
counting is not being claimed for the MATS rule analysis, but any double-
counting is shifted by EPA to the revised NAAQS promulgation, which was 
separately promulgated and not under challenge in the Michigan matter. EPA, 
in its revised NAAQS RIA, stated that:  
																																								 																				
286 EPA, Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous 
Air Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, at 107 
(citing U.S. EPA. 2011. EPA’s Responses to Public Comments on EPA’s National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units. December. Volume 2 of 2. Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-
20126). The EPA counts the benefits from the reductions of pollutants beyond the floor-level 
to avoid any double-counting. Id. However, the opponents of the MATS Rule based on 
double-counting argued that when the industry has already achieved the standards set by the 
particular Clean Air Act rule, which again are set by EPA for maximum benefit with the 
available technology, counting benefits from further reduction beyond floor-level is 
unreliable and such benefits are thus double-counting. Id. EPA clarified further that “PM2.5 
health benefits expected from MATS are not double-counted with benefits estimated in the 
NAAQS RIAs . . . because the NAAQS are not set at a level of zero risk and the science fully 
supports quantifying benefits below the NAAQS, the EPA considers them to be legitimate 
components of the total benefit estimate.” Id. Subsequently, EPA proposed the updated 
NAAQS standards and included MATS Rule as baseline to avoid any double-counting. Id. 
287 Susan E. Dudley, Supp. Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate 
Hazardous Air Pollution from Coal and Oil-Fired Elec. Utility Steam Generating Units (Jan. 
11, 2016), at 107. See also Joint Statement, Inst. for Policy Integrity, NYU Law School (Jan. 
15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009 
-0234-20538&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing 
statement from NYU Law’s Institute for Policy Integrity regarding regulation of coal and oil 
fired power plants). 
288 EPA, Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air 
Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, supra note 286. See 
also Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for Particulate Matter (February 28, 2013), http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Do 
ckey=P100G5UO.pdf (providing analysis for final revision of particulate matter NAAQs). 
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One important distinction between the total public health burden 
estimated for 2005 air pollution levels and the estimated benefits 
in this RIA is that ambient levels of PM2.5 will have improved 
substantially by 2020, due to major emissions reductions result-
ing from implementation of Federal regulations. For example, we 
estimate that SO2 emissions (an important PM2.5 precursor) in the 
United States would fall from 14 million tons in 2005 to less than 
5 million tons by 2020 (a reduction of 66%). For this reason, 
States will only need to achieve small air quality improvements 
to reach the proposed PM standards. As shown in the recent RIA 
for MATS (U.S. EPA, 2011b), implementing other Federal and 
State air quality actions will address a substantial fraction of the 
total public health burden of PM2.5 and ozone air pollution.289  
 
Some professors supported EPA’s use of co-benefits because more 
credible evidence now exists that exposure to methylmercury has adverse 
impacts on the cardiovascular health, and it is “challenging to isolate the neuro-
developmental and cardiovascular impacts of methylmercury exposure from 
seafood consumption because seafood also contains long-chained fatty acids . . . 
serves to mask those deleterious impacts.”290 However, this is more a critique of 
the difficulty of assessing the benefits of health, than it is a principled concept of 
how to structure the cost-benefit algorithm. Another professor stated that “EPA 
correctly avoids double-counting those benefits here” because it only counts 
MATS rule PM2.5 reductions “well below the levels it has already determined 
are ‘protective of public health with an adequate margin of safety.’”291 This last 
																																								 																				
289 Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for Particulate Matter, http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100G5U 
O.pdf. 
290 Joint Statement by Elsie M. Sunderland, Charles T. Driscoll, Jr., James K. Hammitt, 
Philippe Grandjean, John S. Evans, Joel D. Blum, Celia Y. Chen, David C. Evers, Daniel 
A. Jaffe, Robert P. Mason, and the Emmett Environmental Law & Policy Clinic to EPA 
(Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OA 
R-2009-0234-20547&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf 
(citing K.R. Mahaffey, et al., Balancing the benefits of n-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids  
and risks of methylmercury exposure from fish consumption, Nutrition Revs., 69(9): 493-
508 (2011); E. Oken, et al., Maternal fish intake during pregnancy, blood mercury levels 
and child cognition at Age 3 years in a US Cohort, AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY. 167(10): 1171-
1181 (2008)).  
291 Dudley, supra note 115; see also MATS RIA Final, at page 224 (“Approximately 11% 
of the avoided premature deaths occur at or above an annual mean PM2.5 level of 10 µg/m3 
(the LML of the Laden et al. 2006 study), and about 73% occur at or above an annual mean 
PM2.5 level of 7.5 µg/m3 (the LML of the Pope et. Al. 2002 study). As we model avoided 
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statement, however, would seem to invite critique of the true value of separate 
pollutant reductions already necessary and implemented through the NAAQS to 
protect human health. 
EPA’s allocation of co-benefits to prior different rules is not accepted 
by many commenters. The Chief Environmental Officer of the Southern 
Company commented that EPA contradicts its own position taken for NAAQS 
review by still counting the benefits of further reduced particulate matter, a 
criteria pollutant, under HAP hazardous emission control.292 It was asserted 
that this co-benefits calculation clouded EPA’s cost-benefit analysis and 
justification for the MATS rule’s “appropriate and necessary” findings, by 
double-counting the benefits of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide which are 
pollutants covered only under National Ambient Air Quality Standards of the 
Clean Air Act.293  
Other states and commenters were critical of the EPA protocol to 
include co-benefits that are not regulated by the MATS regulation. Opponents 
of the EPA’s consideration of co-benefits from criteria air pollutants not within 
mercury and HAP emission control, argued that such practice is contrary to 
Congress’s intention. Congress intended EPA to consider hazardous HAP co-
benefits but did not allow EPA to consider non-hazardous criteria pollutant co-
benefits.294 On the discretional of EPA to count co-benefits, the Director of the 
Ohio EPA, in comments to US EPA, stated: 
																																								 																				
premature deaths among populations exposed to levels of PM2.5 that are successively lower 
than the LML of each study our confidence in the results diminishes. The International 
Society for Environmental Epidemiology (ISEE) responding to the EPA’s invitation for 
comments on NAAQS standards update, recommends to reduce annual PM2.5 to the level 
of 10 µg/m3 as recommended by WHO’s assessment that “adverse effects on health cannot 
be entirely ruled out below [that] level[].” WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO AIR 
QUALITY GUIDELINES FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, OZONE, NITROGEN DIOXIDE AND 
SULFUR DIOXIDE 10 (2005) [hereinafter WHO AIR QUALITY]; see also MATS RIA Final, 
Figure 5-15. 
292 See Comments of Southern Company to the EPA (Jan. 15, 2016) https://www.regulations. 
gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20543&attachmentNumber=2& 
disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing a statement from Southern Company 
supporting regulation of pollutants from coal and oil power plants). 
293 See Gray, supra note 264 (“PM2.5 and Ozone are both already directly regulated by EPA’s 
NAAQS to a level ‘requisite to protect the public health’ with ‘an adequate margin of safety.’ 
Thus, whenever EPA counts PM2.5 or Ozone reductions in its cost-benefit analysis for other rules, 
it is double-counting reductions already mandated by NAAQS.”).  
294 Id. (“The Agency attempts to justify its reliance on PM co-benefits by pointing to the HAP co-
benefits related to the Acid Rain Program and other CAA programs that were intended to reduce 
criteria pollutant emissions. According to the EPA, if Congress approved of HAP co-benefits 
occurring as a result of criteria pollutant regulation, it is reasonable to assume Congress wanted 
the Agency to account for criteria pollutant co-benefits in the HAPs context. But, this rationale 
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“When U.S. EPA promulgates a revised National Ambient Air 
Quality Standard (NAAQS) it uses the amount of air quality 
improvement as a measure to determine benefits. If a facility 
installs controls to meet the NAAQS and also complies with the 
Utility MATS, plus Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), 
U.S. EPA should not double or even triple count those reductions 
as part of each rulemaking. The health benefit that U.S. EPA 
states is occurring can only occur once, not be recounted multiple 
times under separate U.S. EPA rulemakings.” 295   
 
Similar arguments were expressed by others opposing the MATS rule 
based on EPA’s alleged double-counting of benefits.296 EPA’s reliance on 
counting the benefits from massive criteria pollutant reductions that were 
																																								 																				
reverses Congress’ intent by ignoring that Congress clearly directed the EPA to account for HAP 
co-benefits that would result from regulation under other aspects of the CAA. As a result, 
Congress’ recognition of the HAP co-benefits actually undercut’s the EPA’s reliance on criteria 
pollutant co-benefits to support regulation of HAPs. The EPA’s position would disregard the very 
limitation of §112(n)(1)(a) – which does not permit the Agency to regulate HAP emissions unless 
it deems it “appropriate and necessary” after it has already regulated criteria pollutant emissions 
from EGUs. By seeking to justify regulation of HAP emissions through further reduction of 
criteria pollutants beyond that required by other CAA programs, the EPA essentially circumvents 
the limitations of §112(n)(1)(a).”)). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (“The Administrator shall 
perform a study of the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of 
emissions by electric utility steam generating units of pollutants listed under subsection (b) after 
imposition of the requirements of this Act. The Administrator shall report the results of this study 
to the Congress within 3 years after the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990. The Administrator shall develop and describe in the Administrator’s report to Congress 
alternative control strategies for emissions which may warrant regulation under this section. The 
Administrator shall regulate electric utility steam generating units under this section, if the 
Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the results of 
the study required by this subparagraph.”). 
295 Comment by Ohio Env. Protection Agency to EPA (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.re 
gulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20560&attachment 
Number=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.  
296 See Comment by Counsel for Utility Air Group to EPA (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.regu 
lations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20557&attachment 
Number=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (“In order for there to be co-benefits 
from PM2.5 to attribute to the Proposed Rule, the Proposed Rule must require more 
reductions of primary PM2.5 and PM2.5 precursors (e.g., SO2 and NOx) than would 
otherwise occur under other existing regulations, including the current National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for PM2.5. To include any co-benefits from reductions that  
will occur anyway as a result of the current PM2.5 NAAQS in this rule would be to double-
count those benefits – first as the direct benefits that were counted to justify the PM2.5 
NAAQS in that rule’s 2006 RIA (EPA, 2006), and then again as co-benefits to justify this 
Proposed Rule.”). 
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forecast to occur due to implementation of other NAAQS regulations unrelated 
to MATS to justify MATS and CSAPR, could be viewed, or not viewed, as 
double or triple-counting of benefits.297  
The Supreme Court deferred any comment on the math or algorithm 
that the EPA could use as its methodology to consider costs. Since EPA admit-
ted that it had not considered cost, and did not present to the Court a 
methodology for cost consideration, by its own admission, the Supreme Court 
awaited the EPA to sustain this regulatory burden before evaluating or opining 
on specific elements to be chosen by EPA. It remains an open question whether 
environmental changes that are not the subject of an agency rule can be counted 
as incidental co-benefits of implementing the rule and imposing the rule’s 
costs. Until Michigan, this was an academic exercise. Post Michigan, this 
calculation determines the regulatory future of U.S. law.  
 
VI.  SQUARING THE REGULATORY CIRCLE 
 
A. Legal Precedent 
 
In the absence of congressional clarity, judicial decisions and precedent 
resolve statutory ambiguity and conflicts in interpretation. The author’s search 
for adjudicated EPA cases sanctioning double-counting of benefits produced no 
precedent. Nor did a search for precedential rules for resoving conflict between 
existing federal environmental and energy law, which also yielded no decisions 
or statutory directives.298 These are now matters of unresolved first impression.  
Reverting back to the underlying statute, under the Clean Air Act, there 
is a specified division of state and federal authority where states have the “first-
implementer role,”299 while EPA “is relegated . . . to a secondary role.”300 
However, within this overlapping jurisdictional envelope, there is no federal 
case law, nor any FERC, Department of Energy, or EPA rules, which resolve 
direct conflicts between mandating and counting environmental benefits from 
restraining power plant operation and commands of other agencies to operate 
																																								 																				
297 See Comment by National Mining Association to EPA (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.reg 
ulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20531&attachment 
Number=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing the statement by National 
Mining Association urging EPA to rescind and re-propose its “appropriate and necessary” fin-
ding for electric generating units). 
298 See Ferrey, supra note 48 (proving that author could not find precedent for EPA cases 
sanctioning double-counting). 
299 EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 696 F.3d at 31 (quoting Train v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975)) (emphasis omitted). 
300 Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975). 
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fossil fuel-fired power generation units.301 The closest precedent is provocative 
Supreme Court dicta from four decades ago in Union Electric,302 that an owner 
of a fossil fuel-fired power generation facility can always “shut down its plant 
and curtail electric service” to meet any imposed environmental requirements. 
Congressional testimony in 2014 by FERC Commissioner Clark characterized 
the unresolved conflict between proposed environmental regulation to assist 
climate goals and the countervailing pressure to protect power system 
operating reliability and resiliency as a looming “jurisdictional train wreck.”303  
As close as the court has ventured to resolve environmental and energy 
conflicts, involved not clean air, but the Clean Water Act. In its 2009 River-
keeper decision,304 the Supreme Court held that Congress, pursuant to Clean 
Water Act section 316(b), did not categorically forbid EPA from comparing 
costs to benefits when determining what is the best technology available for 
minimizing adverse environmental impacts of power plant cooling water 
intake structures.305 EPA was left the authority to decide to engage or not in 
such analysis.306 Any Presidential administration could decide how or if to 
exercise this discretion.  
Pursuant to the key Court decision in Michigan v. EPA, Section 112(n) 
of the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate hazardous air pollutants 
from power plants only if it concludes that such regulation is “appropriate and 
necessary.”307 In reaching its conclusion to regulate, EPA stated that cost was 
irrelevant, which the Supreme Court found was not reasonable agency 
interpretation regarding what was “appropriate and necessary.”308 The narrow 
majority in Michigan stated that “no regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does 
significantly more harm than good.”309 Quoting Justice Breyer’s concurring 
opinion in Riverkeeper, the majority further reasoned that: 
																																								 																				
301 See Ferrey, supra note 48 (supporting proposition that author could not find case law or 
rules resolving conflicts in counting environmental benefits). 
302 See generally Union Elec. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (holding that an owner 
of fossil fuel power facility can shut down its plant to meet environmental requirements). 
303 Lynn Garner, FERC Comm’rs Split on Party Lines Over EPA’s Carbon Rule for Power 
Plants, BLOOMBERG (July 29, 2014), http://info.bna.com/climate/summary_news.aspx?ID 
=274977. 
304 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (2009). The Court did not require EPA to 
employ cost-benefit analysis, however EPA must provide a reasoned explanation if it should 
choose to regulate in a way that would do more harm than good, or provide a reasoned 
explanation why the agency is indifferent to that outcome. Id. at 236.  
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 See 42 U.S.C. 7412(n) (regulating hazardous air pollutants). 
308 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699. 
309 Id.  
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Agencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor 
when deciding whether to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects 
the understanding that reasonable regulation ordinarily requires 
paying attention to the advantages and the disadvantages of 
agency decisions. It also reflects the reality that “too much 
wasteful expenditure devoted to one problem may well mean 
considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively with 
other (perhaps more serious) problems.” Against the backdrop of 
this established administrative practice, it is unreasonable to read 
an instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether 
“regulation is appropriate and necessary” as an invitation to 
ignore cost.310 
 
EPA admitted that the overwhelming majority of its total estimated 
MATS benefits – 99.9% – are due to reduction of particulate matter and sulfur 
dioxide, which as criteria pollutants, are not regulated by the MATS rule, 
which only regulates mercury and air toxics as hazardous pollutants.311 Criteria 
pollutants, under different parts of the Act, already are subject to “stringent” 
regulations for NAAQS and also are further reduced by EPA’s separate 
CSAPR rule.312 “Incidental” co-benefits have both a qualitative and quanti-
tative element. Under the MATS regulation, the indirect incidental co-benefits 
are not incidiental in quantitative amount—they are totally responsible, alone, 
for changing the cost-benefit calculation to make total benefits exceed cost and 
thereby quantitatively justify regulation.313 Ninety-nine and nine-tenth percent 
of the total benefits from these MATS Clean Air Act regulations are from 
estimated reduced mortality due to a “co-benefit” reduction in particulate 
matter criteria pollutants.314  
The question still remaining to be resolved by the Court is: Can the “co-
benefits” tail wag the direct benefit regulatory dog? EME Homer established 
the permissibility of cost considerations under an admittedly ambiguous 
different provision of the Clean Air Act.315 Where PM2.5 criteria pollution 
already regulated elsewhere in the Act must be reduced by an explicit “adequ-
ate margin of safety” for human health below its NAAQS standards, in the cost 
																																								 																				
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. 
313 See Krauss, supra note 8; Jaber & Horner, supra note 239 (providing that the indirect criteria 
pollutant co-benefits, unregulated by MATS, are 99.9% of total benefits counted by EPA, while 
the directly MATS-regulated CO2 benefits are 0.1% of total benefits counted by EPA). 
314 See id.  
315 Morss & Wooley, THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 42 at 4. 
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algorithm can an agency also count additional reductions in PM2.5 that are not 
regulated by the challenged MATS rule?316 This is still a matter yet to be 
determined by the Court. 
 
B. The Next Step 
 
This is a matter of first impression for the Court: There are no precedent 
on this issue of the regulatory operands, nor, amazingly, on the more broad 
question of using environmental mechanisms to influence energy generator 
operation.317 So where does this leave regulatory cost and the law? The Mich-
igan Supreme Court decision did not dimish Chevron deference for the EPA 
to make the initial choice of the cost analysis methodology and algorithm for 
assessing costs.318 However once selected and applied by the agency, its 
method-ology still can be reviewed by the Supreme Court under the “hard-
look” doctrine established in Overton Park v. Volpe.319 In Overton Park, 
Justice Marshall, also speaking for a unanimous Court, reversed the agency 
reading of the statute, to discourage adding any consideration of costs or 
benefits.320 However, Overton Park did not involve the Clean Air Act or EPA, 
and instead involved the confiscation by the Department of Transportation of 
park property and other land to build a highway.321   
The Clean Air Act provides no guidance as to cost thresholds or how 
costs and benefits should be calculated. The Act’s Section 112 does not require 
that hazardous air pollutant emission control costs can be compared with 
benefits of reduced mercury hazardous air pollutants only. The Michigan Court 
noted that costs include the up-front cost of implementation, but also include 
																																								 																				
316 See Dudley, supra note 112 (providing background leading author to ask hypothetical 
question). See also MATS RIA Final, at page 224 (“Approximately 11% of the avoided 
premature deaths occur at or above an annual mean PM2.5 level of 10 µg/m3 (the LML of the 
Laden et al. 2006 study), and about 73% occur at or above an annual mean PM2.5 level of 7.5 
µg/m3 (the LML of the Pope et. Al. 2002 study). The International Society for Environmental 
Epidemiology (ISEE) responding to the EPA’s invitation for comments on NAAQS 
standard’s update, recommends reducing annual PM2.5 to the level of 10 µg/m3 as 
recommended by WHO’s assessment that “adverse effects on health cannot be entirely ruled 
out even below that level.” WHO AIR QUALITY supra note 291; see also MATS RIA Final, 
Figure 5-15 (accounting for additional benefits). 
317 See Ferrey, supra note 48 (establishing that author could not find precedent). 
318 See Michigan 135 S. Ct. 2699 (supporting that court did not diminish Chevron deference). 
319 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (establishing “hard-
look” doctrine). 
320 Id. at 412 (indicating that consideration of environmental costs and benefits is part of 
Department of Transportation, rather than EPA, statute).  
321 Id. 
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the cost of compliance with the rulemaking.322 If challengers can successfully 
categorize reduced revenues from fewer generation hours of operation of an 
affected power generation facility as costs of complying with the regulation, 
EPA’s rulemaking could be deemed by challengers as not benefit-positive or 
as administratively unreasonable. 
Citing the recent Supreme Court decision in King v. Burwell,323 deci-
ded in the same Court term, the challenging states on the cost issue in the 
MATS regulation maintained that EPA would require explicit authority from 
Congress to regulate an area in which it does not regularly participate (e.g. 
electricity generation) or to implement aggressive measures to reorganize how 
power is generated and sold in America, which is within FERC, not EPA, 
jurisdiction. In King, the Court held that the IRS would not be granted Chevron 
deference because the IRS does not have expertise in crafting health insurance 
policies; Congress would have to grant express authority to the agency in order 
to have this.324 When the costs of regulations are monetized, the benefits 
typically must be too, as articulated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.325 
The court concluded that the agency, NHTSA, “cannot put a thumb on the scale 
by undervaluing the benefits and overvaluing the costs of more stringent 
standards.”326 
The next step is for the agency to exercise. To start, the Supreme Court 
in Arlington v. FCC held that Chevron327 deference applies to an agency’s 
interpretation of the scope of its own statutory jurisdiction: “statutory ambigui-
ties will be resolved, within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, not by the 
courts but by the administering agency.”328 There is no distinction in terms of 
																																								 																				
322 The Environmental Protection Agency must consider cost—including, most importantly, cost 
of compliance—before deciding whether regulation of power plants under the Clean Air Act is 
appropriate and necessary. Clean Air Act, § 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A); 
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699.  
323 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (providing case that the challenging states cited). 
324 Id. at 2488. “When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we often apply the two-
step framework announced in Chevron. Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is 
ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. This approach is ‘premis-
ed on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the 
agency to fill in the statutory gaps.’ In extraordinary cases, however, there may be a reason to 
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.” Id.   
325 See Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (indicating that one cannot count lopsided costs or benefits and 
not the other when setting monetized environmental standards under the Clean Air Act 
regarding greenhouse gas emissions). 
326 Id. 
327 See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing test for deference to administrative actions). 
328 City of Arlington, Texas v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (citing AT&T Corp. v. 
Iowa Util. Bldg., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999)). 
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deference afforded the agency between an agency’s “jurisdictional” and “non-
jurisdictional” interpretations:329 “[i]f ‘the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute,’ that is the end of the matter.”330  
A different presidential administration, by executive action without 
congressional approval, can change either or both the OMB cost-benefit regu-
lations and/or the substantive EPA Clean Air Act regulations. Executive Order 
13771 of the Trump Administration directs that no agency may issue a new 
rule unless the agency offsets the costs of the new rule by rescinding at least 
two existing ones.331 The court found that environmental organizations could 
not demonstrate standing or injury to challenge this as an unconstitutional 
regulation violating the Administrative Procedure Act, in 2018.332  
The executive branch began a process in 2017 to re-evaluate the 
“benefit” attributed to saving a life or saving emission of CO2 from coal-fired 
and other facilities.333 At EPA, in mid-2018, the agency released an Advance 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to re-examine all cost and benefit analysis  
by the agency.334 The notice notes both the recent Michigan335 and the River-
keeper336 Supreme Court opinions, which require or permit, respectively, 
																																								 																				
329 Id. No “exception exists to the normal [deferential] standard of review” for “jurisdictional or 
legal question[s] concerning the coverage” of an Act. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 
822, 830 n.7 (1984). There is no principled basis for carving out an arbitrary subset of 
“jurisdictional” questions from the Chevron framework. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. 
Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333, 339 (2002) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44). 
330 Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874-75 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). The Supreme Court 
has afforded Chevron deference to agencies’ constructions of the scope of their own 
jurisdiction. See generally, Commodity Futures Trading Co. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); 
United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (2009). 
331 See Presidential Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 
WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/30/presi-
dential-executive-order-reducing-regulation-and-controlling (Providing White House Executive 
Order on regulation). See also, Public Citizen, Inc., et al., v. Donald Trump, Civil Action No. 17-
253 (Rdm) (D.C., 2017) (Case in which Executive Order was challenged). 
332 Challenge to Trump’s 2-for-1 Deregulatory Order Rejected, Bloomberg Environment, 
Feb. 26, 2018, https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-energy/challenge-to-trumps-2-
for-1-deregulatory-order-rejected. 
333 See Gabriel Nelson, EPA Plans to Revisit a Touchy Topic – the Value of Saved Lifes, 
GREENWIRE (Jan.18, 2011), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059944118 (providing evi-
dence that EPA will re-evaluate the benefit of saving lives).  
334 Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Costs and Benefits in the Rule-
making Process, ENV’TL PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-06 
/documents/cost_and_benefit_consideration_anprm_pre-pub.pdf?utm_source=Federal+State+Po 
licy+Updates+June+2018&utm_campaign=State+and+Federal+Updates&utm_medium=email.  
335 Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2705. 
336 Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 208.  
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agency consideration of costs.337 The EPA notice includes that a comment 
submitted to the Agency “has justified the stringency of a standard based on the 
estimated benefits from reductions in pollutants not directly regulated by the 
action (i.e., ‘ancillary benefits’ or ‘co-benefits’).”338 Things are now again in 
motion. Coming full circle, fifteen states—Michigan, Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming–sued EPA in the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 2016, for re-affirming its MATS 
rule.339 Law has now changed so that EPA must consider cost before issuing 
certain Clean Air Act regulations.340 However, the algorithm and inputs to the 
cost calculation were not yet before the Court because EPA had not presented a 
new cost algorithm for the Court to examine.341 Thus, this established a new 
legal requirement, with no details yet on the algorithm for this now legally 
required undertaking. The mechanism going forward is the next major matter of 
first impression for the Court. Notwithstanding, Michigan v. EPA342 changed the 
constitutional separation of powers, as well as mandating a quantitative process 
as part of making law through certain regulation.  
 
																																								 																				
337 Id. 
338 See Increasing Consistency supra note 334, at 6.  
339 See Petition for Review, Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette v. U.S. Env’tl Prot. 
Agency, No. 16-1204 (June 24, 2016 D.C. Cir.), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/ 
desktop/document/Michigan_Attorney_General_Bill_Schuette_v_US_Environmental_Prot
ec?1469159801 (lawsuit brought by states against EPA for reaffirming MATS rule).  
340 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711. 
341 Id.  
342 Id.  
